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SECTION I 
INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS 
1.1 READ1 CONCEPT 
The READ1 concept comprises an on- 
board instrumentation and control system 
that senses abnormal operation of rocket 
engine propulsion systems and institutes 
emergency remedial actions to reduce the 
consequences of malfunctions upon mission 
success and crew safety. The remedial 
actions function to limit the secondary 
effects of the malfunction and, when 
possible, capitalize on inherent vehicle 
redundancy to replace lost functions. 
The concept emphasizes accurate and early 
identification of malfunctions to avoid 
unnecessary aborts and allow adequate 
lead time for crew escape when abort is 
necessary. 
1.2 PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS 
The preceding two phases have pro- 
vided answers to some of the major ques- 
tions concerning the READ1 concept. 
Phase I established that the effectiveness 
of a READ1 system for a typical engine 
and launch vehicle stage could justify 
the additional on-board equipment required 
and still produce a substantial gain in 
terms of cost effectiveness. Design 
procedures were developed to achieve the 
optimum READ1 system design and level of 
complexity. During the Phase II investi- 
gation the development of design procedures 
was continued and an experimental system 
was built to demonstrate that a very high 
reliability could be achieved. The 
experimental system made extensive use of 
microcircuitry, information redundancy, 
and special signal validity tests to 
achieve very low false alarm rates. 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESENT 
INVESTIGATION 
The READ1 design procedure developed 
in the previous two phases of the program 
is shown in figure l-l. The shaded boxes 
represent key steps in this procedure 
that involve the development of mathematical 
models for the mission, vehicle stages, 
and subsystems to describe their operation 
under malfunction conditions. The objec- 
tive of the present investigation was to 
develop a set of these malfunction effect 
models which would be applicable to a 
real mission-vehicle-engine combination. 
Specifically the Apollo Manned Lunar 
Landing Mission and the Saturn V launch 
vehicle have been selected for analysis 
in this study because of the availability 
of real data and current interest in these 
programs. The J-2 .engine was selected as 
an example of the vehicle subsystems since 
it is used in two stages of the Saturn V 
launch vehicle. 
The malfunction effects models have 
been utilized in a concurrent program, 
Contract No. NAS 8-11290, to actually 
synthesize and evaluate a READ1 system for 
the Saturn V. The final report on that 
program describes in detail the functional 
design and effectiveness estimates for the 
systems. (1) 
Tl, - - - - - Refer to reference 1, Appendix C. 
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It should be noted that the mal- 
function effects models by themselves do 
not constitute a complete solution to the 
problem of designing a READ1 system. 
Their purpose is to provide the designer 
with a set of tools which enables him to 
determine, in a logical and systematic 
manner, the ultimate effect of a mal- 
function and decision pair upon the 
mission success and crew safety. The 
summation of this data over the set of 
probable malfunctions which can occur 
during a flight comprises the input data 
to the Maltiction and Decision Pair 
Analysis Compilation (MADPAC). The result 
of MADPAC is a computer printout which, 
as shown in figure l-1, contains the 
necessary data to synthesize and evaluate 
READ1 systems. Details of the format of 
this document are contained in this report, 
since an organized data handling procedure 
such as this is believed to be essential 
in applying the design techniques to 
large scale problems. 
launch vehicle, can be assimilated, pro- 
cessed, and used effectively to assure 
that the READ1 system design considers 
these data in a proper perspective. 
The models and computational proce- 
dures have also proved to be of great 
value in organizing and assigning tasks 
to the team of design engineers and in 
providing a standardized format for record 
keeping and communication among the 
various specialists who are required 
during the analysis of the vehicle. 
1.5 ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
1.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Mathematical relationships relating 
malfunction and remedial actions to their 
effects on crew safety and mission suc- 
cess have been derived and are presented 
as a series of mathematical models and 
computational procedures. The application 
of these techniques to the Saturn V launch 
vehicle has demonstrated that the large 
volume of reliability and failure effects 
data, typical of a complex multistage 
Figure l-2 illustrates the applica- 
tion of the various malfunction effects 
models to assess the effect on mission 
success and crew safety of a particular 
malfunction coupled with a specific re- 
medial action. The probability of crew 
and mission loss is computed from a chain 
of conditional probabilities based on the 
models. Since the mission and abort 
models have the most direct relationship 
with the final outputs of crew and mission 
risk, these models are discussed first 
in Sections II and III. The vehicle per- 
formance degradation models are discussed 
in Section IV followed by the engine or 
subsystem malfunctions effects models in 
Section V. The MADPAC format is detailed 
in Section VI, and the malfunction sensing 
model is presented in Section VII to com- 
plete the chain from the initial malfunc- 
tion through all the intermediate effects 
to the final losses. 
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SECTION II 
MISSION MODEL 
2.1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
The mission model discussed in this 
section is a mathematical representation 
of the mission which permits en assess- 
ment of the degree of mission success and 
crew safety, given certain conditions of 
vehicle performance degradation. 
The mission chosen for analysis is 
the Apollo Manned Lunar Landing Mission. 
The prime mission is, of course, well 
defined; however, in the event performance 
degradations preclude attainment of the 
prime mission, there are various less 
well defined alternate missions that may 
still be possible as Indicated in figure 
2-l. The mission model must recognize 
the value of these alternates in order to 
be realistic. A single number representa- 
tive of mission success can be obtained 
if the various alternate missions are 
assigned weighting values that represent 
the worth of each alternate mission 
relative to the prime mission. 
The capability of attaining the 
prime and alternate missions, having 
achieved earth orbit and assuming per- 
fect spacecraft operation, can be ex- 
pressed in terms of the residual propel- 
lants contained by the SIVB in a standard 
100 nm orbit. These relationships, which 
are the result of the mission analysis, 
are summarized In figure 2-2. Effects 
on mission capability prior to achieve- 
ment of earth orbit, due to staging and 
other constraints, are shown separately 
for the three stages in figures 2-3, 2-4, 
and 2-5. 
2.2 ALTERNATE MISSIONS 
The missions considered as favorable. 
alternates to the lunar exploration mis- 
sion have not to date been designated 
by NASA. For the purposes of this study, 
therefore, a Set of alternate missions 
has been assumed that is believed to 
represent the preliminary results of 
NASA's thinking at this time. 
Likewise, relative worth values 
were assigned to the alternate missions 
on a rather arbitrary basis with the 
realization that these weighting values 
will change with each particular mission 
depending upon the accomplishments of 
previous missions. The weighted numbers 
affect only the optimization of READ1 
design; the latter does not appear to be 
a strong function of the exact values 
used. 
The set of alternate missions used 
and the assigned relative worth values 
are given below: 
Mission Relative Value 
Prime Lunar Landing 1.0 
Mission 
i 
Lunar Orbit 0.4 
Alternate Circumlunar 0.3 
Missions Earth Orbit 0.05 
Earth DirectAbort 0.0 
2.3 ALTERNATE MISSION CAPABILITY 
The capability of the Saturn V vehicle 
to achieve the prime or an alternate mis- 
SiOn can be expressed in terms of the 
residual propellant aboard the SIX3 stage 
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after it has reached 100 nm orbit. If 
a normal ascent to orbit has occurred, 
the SIVB stage will have a certain pro- 
pellent mass, MpRN, available for inject- 
ing the payload into a translunar 
trajectory. With the vehicle parameters 
assumed for the mission model, over 98.1 
percent of this propellent mass is re- 
quired during SIVB second burn to attain 
the necessary velocity increment (AV) for 
translunar injection. If more than two 
percent of the normally available pro- 
pellant had been used during SIVB first 
burn to reach orbit, then the AV required 
for translunar injection cannot be sup- 
plied by the SIVB stage alone; the deficit 
must be made up by the Service Module (SM). 
Depending upon the auount of propellant 
expended by the SM for this purpose, its 
capability for achieving the prime mission 
will either be eliminated or, at the very 
least, reduced in safety margin. 
The reduction in the propellant 
available for SIVB second burn is caused 
by performance losses during the boost 
phase which are compensated for by a 
longer-than-normal SIVB first burn. It 
is assumed that the adaptive guidance 
system of the Saturn V launch vehicle 
automatically controls the SIVB burn time 
until orbital conditions have been at- 
tained. For example, assume that READ1 
initiates SII engine cutoff 20 seconds 
before normal depletion cutoff in anti- 
cipation of an explosion hazard. In order 
to achieve 100 nm orbit, the SIVB stage 
would have to burn longer than normally 
planned, and a reduction in the propellant 
available for second burn results, Per- 
formance maps have been prepared to relate 
the effects of various malfunction and 
decision pairs to a reduction in MpR. 
These performance maps are discussed in 
Section IV of this report. This section 
describes the alternate mission capability 
as a function of MpR, the propellant 
available for SIVB second burn. 
2.4 CALCULATIONS OF AV 
The approach taken in determining 
the alternate mission capability is 
summarized by the following steps: 
(a) Determine the velocity increments 
(AVIS) required during various 
phases of the prime (lunar landing) 
mission. 
(b) Use these AVIS to determine the 
amount of SK propellant needed for 
alternate missions, and calculate 
the unused propellant on-board 
the SM. 
(c) Calculate the contribution this 
"excess" SM propellant could make 
to the velocity increment required 
for lunar injection from 100 nm 
earth orbit. 
(d) Compute the amount of SIVB pro- 
pellant needed to complete the AV 
required for lunar injection. 
The following are the input data 
which have been used in determining the 
alternate mission capability for the 
Saturn V mission model: 
- Mass in 100 nm 
orbit 
277,800 lbs 
- Mass of propellant (-1 6,000 
vented in orbit 
271,800 
- Mass of propellant C-1 144,500 
available for SIVB 
second burn 
127,300 
2-4 
Mass of empty SIVB, IU 
Mass .of SIVB adapter 
and shroud 
Mass of payload after 
lunar injection 
Mass of Service Module 
(SM) propellant 
C-1 37,300 
90,000 
C-1 3,400 
86,600 
(-) 37,500 
Mass of Lunar 
Excursion Module (LEM) 
Mass of empty Command 
Service Module (CSM) 
49,100 
C-1 28,000 
21,100 
- Service Module engine specific im- 
pulse Isp = 310 set (these values 
were estimated for the purpose of 
generating the model, and do not 
represent actual values.) (2 1 
- Service Module propellant flow 
rate = 70 lbs/sec 
- SIVB engine specific impulse Isp = 
425 set (estimated). 
The velocity increments (AVIS) required 
of the SM during the lunar landing mission 
were calculated using the assumed values 
of I sP in the following equation 
AV = I mO sp go lnm f 
where 
I sP = specific impulse of engine 
g0 = gravitational constant = 32.2 
ft/sec2 
mO = initial mass of vehicle before 
thrusting 
In f = final mass of vehicle after 
thrusting. 
- - - - - - - 
(2)Refer to Reference 2, Appendix C. 
The calculations are summarized in table 
2-1. 
2.5 LUNAR ORBIT MISSION 
A lunar orbit mission might be under- 
taken if the following conditions existed: 
- The SIVB and payload were in 100 nm 
earth orbit with insufficient SIVB 
propellant to complete the prime 
mission. 
- The CSM systems were in a "go" 
condition. 
For the purpose of generating the model, 
the lunar orbit mission was assumed to 
consist of the following steps: 
- The available SIVB propellant is used 
to escape from earth orbit and start 
the payload towards a translunar 
trajectory. 
- At SIVB burnout, the CSM separates 
and thrusts to provide the additional 
AV requiredto attain- the.nominal 
velocity needed for a 72-hour transit 
time. The LEM is left behind. 
- The CSM retrofires and goes into lunar 
orbit. The only difference between 
the prime and alternate missions 
after this point is that no lunar 
descent takes place. 
In order to determine the mass of SIVB pro- 
pellant required for lunar orbit, it is 
necessary to first calculate the "excess" 
propellant aboard the SM. If a safety fac- 
tor of 500 pounds of SM propellant is 
assumed, the weight of the CSM at earth 
re-entry will be 21,100 + 500 = 21,600 
pounds. By using this number and the AV's 
computed for the prime mission in subsec- 
tion 2.4 the "excess" SM propellant is 
found to be 11,900 pounds. The calcula- 
tions are summarized in table 2-2. 
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Table 2-l. SERVICE MODULE AV's REQUIRED DURING LUNAR LANDING MISSION 
Operation 
(a) Midcourse 
corrections 
(b) Retrofire to 
lunar orbit 
(c> Transearth 
injection 
(d) Midcourse 
corrections 
Burn Time 
(set 1 m, (lbs) 
86,600 
83,475 
31,175(2) 
23,200 
mf (lbs) 
83,475 
-- -.. 
AV(ft/sec) 
375 
59,175 3450 
23,200 (2940>(1) 
940 
The numbers in parentheses were used as the input data for the calculation across the 
row, as they were considered to be the most reliable information. 
(1) AV = 2940 = (8230-5290) = (lunar escape velocity for 72-hour transi 
80 nm orbital velocity) 
(2) 
mO 
= 31,175 = (59,175-28,000) = (mass in lunar orbit - mass of LEM) 
(3) 
mf = 21,100 = mass of CSM at re-entry. 
Table 2-2. CALCULATIONS TO DETERMINE EXCESS SM PROPELLANT 
Oneration 
AV Req'd 
(ft/sec) 
(d) Midcourse correction (earth return) 940 
(c) Transearth injection 2940 
(b) Retrofire to lunar orbit 3450 
(a) Midcourse correction (to moon) 375 
mf (lbs) 
~ p- 
21,600 
23,800 
31,900 
44,950 
It can be seen from the data listed in 
table 2-2 that the mass of the CSM after 
injection to lunar orbit is 46,700 
pounds. Since the initial weight of the 
CSM was 58,600 pounds (payload - LEM), 
the "excess" SM propellant is 11,900 
pounds. The AV available for translunar 
injection from this propellant is found 
by solving equation (1) and is equal to 
2280 ft/sec. Since the total velocity 
increment needed for lunar injection from 
100 nm earth orbit is 10,050 ft/sec., the 
remainder must be supplied by the SIVB 
second burn. That is, 
time - lunar 
a, (lbs 
23,800 
31,900 
44,950 
46,700 
AVsIVR = AV required for injection - 
AV supplied by SM 
= 10,050 - 2280 = 7770 ft/sec. 
Using the assumed Isp of 425 seconds and 
a *f of 127,300 pounds for the SIVB (see 
page 2-31, equation (1) can be solved for 
m,, the initial weight of the SIVB prior 
to lunar injection: 
mO =m = 225,000 lbs. 
(2) 
The mass of the SIVB propellant which con- 
tributes to the translunar injection 
2-6 
velocity is the difference between m, and 
mf' or 97,700 pounds. Since the propellent 
mass available for SIVB second burn under 
normal conditions is 144,500 pounds, the 
percentage required to achieve a lunar 
orbit mission is seen to be approximately 
67 percent. 
2.6 CIRCUMLUNAR MISSION 
A circumlunar mission might be sub- 
stituted for the prime mission in either 
of the following situations: 
- The SIVB and payload are in 100 nm 
earth orbit with insufficient SIVB 
propellant to complete either a lunar 
landing or lunar orbit mission. 
- A malfunction during SIVB second burn 
necessitates engine cutoff before 
attaining a velocity sufficient to 
complete a lunar orbit mission. 
In the latter situation the premature 
engine cutoff can be equated to the mass 
of propellant which would result in the 
same velocity increment so that, for the 
purpose of the model, the two situations 
are identical. 
The amount of SIVB propellant neces- 
sary to achieve a circumlunar mission is 
calculated in the same manner as was de- 
scribed in subsection 2.5 for the lunar 
orbit mission. The major difference is 
that the AV required to prescribe an 
elliptical orbit around the moon is less 
than that required to go into and escape 
from a lunar orbit. It is assumed that, 
in addition to the midcourse corrections, 
the total AV required for velocity and 
path corrections for a circumlunar mission 
is 1000 ft/sec. Using the same safety 
factor of 500 pounds of SM propellant, 
the SIVB propellant required for a 
circumlunar mission was calculated. The 
results are summarized below: 
- SM propellant required 6,150 lbs 
for circumlunar 
operations 
- SM propellant avail- 31,350 lbs 
able for translunar 
injection 
- AV for translunar in- 7,710 ft/sec 
jection supplied by SM 
- AV for translunar in- 2,340 ft/sec 
jection supplied by 
SIVB 
- SIVB propellant re- 23,700 lbs 
quired for translunar 
injection 
- Percent of normal SIVB z 16%. 
residual propellant, 
MPRN 
2.7 STAGE TRANSITION MODELS 
In order to determine the increase in 
mission value resulting from a READ1 de- 
cision, the capability of the launch 
vehicle to achieve alternate missions must 
be known. The transition block diagram of 
figure 2-l illustrates the wide range of 
possible deviations from a normal mission, 
and emphasizes the capacity of the Saturn 
V vehicle to achieve an alternate mission 
in the event of a malfunction. It can be 
seen from figure 2-l that the alternate 
mission selected depends upon the nature 
of the malfunction and decision, and the 
time at which it occurs. 
Those malfunctions which are non- 
hazardous generally cause a performance 
loss and can be analyzed in terms of their 
effect upon MpR, the residual SIVB pro- 
pellant in 100 nm orbit. Malfunctions 
2-7 
which may be termed hazardous require 
either an immediate abort or the shutting 
down of one or more engines, depending 
upon the mission phase. In order to 
show these transition possibilities more 
clearly, the mission has been divided into 
phases corresponding to the SIC, SII, and 
SIVB stages, and transition models have 
been prepared for each, figures Z-3, 2-4, 
and 2-5. The stage models are subdivided 
into phases which are defined by discrete 
operational events. These events, repre- 
sented as nodes on the diagrams, serve to 
group the types of malfunctions which can 
occur during a phase. 
For example, consider the SII stage 
transition model, figure 2-4. The model 
is characterized by an initial condition 
state (corresponding to normal SIC burn 
out) and six possible end condition 
states. The model shows that the decision 
to shut down a single SII engine can re- 
sult in one of two different end states, 
depending upon when the malfunction and 
decision occurs. For the interval between 
SII ignition and a time approximately 410 
seconds after liftoff (t = 4101, a single 
engine cutoff will result in loss of prime 
mission capability, but a lunar orbital 
mission is still possible. (Normal opera- 
tion of the following stages is assumed.) 
For the interval between t = 410 seconds 
and normal engine cutoff, the model shows 
that prime mission is achievable even with 
one engine out. Thus, the increase in 
mission value resulting from the remedial 
action decision to shut down an SII engine, 
as compared with the no-decision case, must 
be summed over the two time intervals in- 
volved. Similar procedures are used to 
analyze other paths of the stage transi- 
tion models. 
2-8 
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SECTION III 
ABORT MODEL 
3 .l INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
The abort model is used to determine 
the effects on mission success and crew 
safety in the event that an abort is re- 
quired at some time during the launch op- 
eration. Abort as used here refers to the 
process of separating the crew from a 
failed stage to avoid the possibility of 
crew loss caused by structural breakup or 
explosion. This action is necessary for 
certain uncorrectable malfunctions that 
result in severe loss of performance, ex- 
cessive vehicle rates, or explosions. 
The abort model is comprised of two 
parts, the escape model and the recovery 
model. The escape model describes the 
probability of safely separating from and 
clearing the failed stage as a function of 
mission time and lead (or warning) time. 
The recovery model describes the ensuing 
capability for alternate mission accomplish 
ment and safe crew recovery. 
Figure 3-l summarizes the preferred 
method of abort, alternate mission that 
is achievable, and assumed value of re- 
covery crew risk for the first and second 
stages of Saturn V; figure 3-2 summarizes 
the above data for the third stage. Fig- 
ures 3-4, 3-7, and 3-9 summarize the lead- 
time required for safe crew escape under 
various hazardous conditions. 
3.2 ABORT MODES 
3.2.1 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
The preferred method of abort is de- 
pendent upon factors such as the nature of 
the contingency and the mission phase during 
which it occurs. The objective of the 
abort decision is to attain the highest 
valued alternate mission possible without 
endangering the crew. Because the upper 
stages of the Saturn V have a high per- 
formance capability, a malfunction in the 
launch vehicle can often be left behind 
while the spacecraft fulfills an alternate 
mission. For example, assume an explosion 
hazard is detected during the first 20 
seconds of SII burn, before the Launch 
Escape System (LES) has been jettisoned. 
If the malfunction is detected sufficiently 
in advance of the explosion, it may be 
possible to shut down the SII engines, 
stage to the SIVB, and achieve earth orbit 
with the aid of the (SM) propulsion system. 
If, on the other hand, the need for an 
immediate abort is indicated, the LES 
would be used to separate the spacecraft 
from the launch vehicle and return it 
directly to earth. This example emphasizes 
the importance of detecting the malfunction 
as far in advance of the resultant explo- 
sion or breakup as possible. Not only is 
the crew safety enhanced by early detec- 
tion, but the probability of completing an 
alternate mission with greater scientific 
value is also increased. 
3.2.2 METHoDs OF ABORT 
The example described in paragraph 
3.2.1 also serves to illustrate the two 
general methods of abort which were used 
in construction of the abort model, namely 
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- Abort using the LES 
- Abort from the Saturn V vehicle by 
premature engine shut down and 
staging. 
The former method would be used dur- 
ing SIC boost and the first 20 seconds of 
SII boost before the LES is jettisoned. 
The only alternate mission which can be 
achieved using the LES is a direct earth 
return. If abort is required during the 
SII burn after the LES is jettisoned, the 
normal procedure would be to shut down 
engines and stage to the SIVB. However, 
the nature of the malfunction may require 
staging directly to the SM. During SIVB 
burn, abort would be accomplished by 
engine shutdown and staging to the SM. In 
summary, then, the abort modes may be 
classified according to the stage under 
consideration as follows: 
- SIC burn: - Abort using LES 
- SII burn: - Abort using LES 
- Engine shutdown and stage 
to SIVB 
- Engine shutdown and 
stage to SM. 
- SIVB burn: - Engine shutdown and stage 
to SM. 
It should be noted that abort during 
SIC boost could be accomplished at some 
point in time after liftoff by engine 
shutdown and staging to either SII or 
SIVB. This procedure could only take 
place late in the SIC burn after certain 
altitude and velocity requirements have 
been fulfilled. These possibilities are 
being investigated by NASA at the present 
time. 
A premature staging operation will 
usually, although not always, result in 
loss of prime mission capability. The 
time during the mission at which engine 
shutdown and staging occur determines 
which of the alternate missions can be 
achieved. This is shown by the Stage 
Abort and Crew Risk Models, figures 3-1 
and 3-2. The models summarize the follow- 
ing information for each stage: 
- The malfunction effect which leads 
to abort 
- The method of abort 
- The alternate mission achievable 
after abort. 
3.3 CREW RISK 
3.3.1 GENERAL 
In order to determine the reduction 
in crew risk derived from a READ1 decision 
to abort, as compared with the no-action 
case, it is necessary to evaluate the 
relative risks to the crew associated with 
the various abort modes considered in sub- 
section 3.2. First, however, the closely 
related concept of "escape" should be ex- 
amined briefly. The Escape Model, which 
is discussed in subsection 3.4, determines 
the lead time required to escape safely 
from an explosion, breakup, or other 
hazardous condition, given an abort de- 
cision. The lead time and method of abort 
are used to estimate the probability of 
safe escape which is needed for READ1 sys- 
tem evaluation. The Escape Model is the 
principal factor in determining whether 
or not an abort will result in a catastro- 
phic loss. Once the "escape" period has 
passed, the crew risk is dependent primarily 
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upon the vehicle unreliability and the 
surrounding environment. A safe escape 
will lead to one of two situations: 
- An abort mode in which an earth or 
lunar orbit is achievable 
- An abort mode which results in a di- 
rect earth return. 
A sharp distinction can be drawn be- 
tween these two situations so far as crew 
risk is concerned. In the former case, 
assuming a safe escape has already oc- 
curred, the risk to the crew is essentially 
the same as would exist during a normal 
boost. Once earth orbit is achieved, the 
crew is afforded the opportunity to maxi- 
mize mission value by choosing an alter- 
nate mission or, if this is not possible, 
to descend to earth at a preferred landing 
site. 
If, on the other hand, the abort re- 
sults in a direct return to earth, the 
probability of safe crew return is sub- 
stantially reduced. In order to assign 
crew risk values during abort for the 
purpose of READ1 system evaluation, the 
following ground rules have been 
established: 
- For an abort which permits an earth 
or lunar orbit to be achieved, no in- 
crease in crew risk over that 
normally encountered is incurred. 
- For an abort which results in a di- 
rect earth return,,an additional 
crew risk is assigned. 
3.3.2 DIRECT EARTH ABORT ' 
The additional crew risk incurred 
during a direct earth abort is determined 
primarily by the time during the flight 
profile at which the abort takes place. 
The SIC and SII Abort and Crew Risk Model, 
figure 3-1, shows that a direct earth re- 
turn may be required any time after launch 
up to approximately 500 seconds. For the 
interval between SIC ignition and 174 sec- 
onds after liftoff, the LES is used for 
direct earth abort. This interval contains 
several periods which are especially criti- 
cal for abort because of the surrounding 
environment, as indicated below. 
3.3.2.1 Liftoff and Shortly Afterwards - 
Assuming there is sufficient lead time to 
effect a safe escape, an abort during this 
period is still subjected to the following 
hazardous conditions: 
- Unsuccessful separation due to vehicle 
or LES collision with launch umbilical 
tower. 
- Minimum altitude (4000 ft) required 
for parachute deployment not attained 
by LES. 
- Proper orientation of Command Module 
(CM) not achieved because of drogue 
parachute assembly failure. 
3.3.2.2 Maximum Dynamic Pressure (Max Q) 
and Transonic Regions - The greatest hazard 
during the Max & period is the possibility 
of exceeding the structural limits of the 
LES or the spacecraft itself due to ex- 
cessive angle of attack. During the rela- 
tively short transonic period the accelera- 
tion of the launch vehicle exceeds that of 
the LES, and SIC engine shutdown is 
mandatory. 
3.3.2.3 High Altitude Region - During 
this period the normal abort hazards are 
increased due to the high velocity already 
achieved, crew acceleration limits, and 
spacecraft heating considerations. A 
further hazard results from having to 
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recover the spacecraft several hundred 
miles downrange in a nonipreferred landing 
area. 
During these high risk periods, the 
probability of crew loss is greater than 
it would be for a "normal" LES abort. This 
is indicated by figures 3-1 and 3-2, where 
the conditional probability of crew loss 
(PcL) is plotted as a function of flight 
time. The value of PcL for an LES abort 
during a non-critical period is taken as 
0.02. It should be kept in mind that the 
value is conditional upon an abort situa- 
tion, which has a relatively low probabil- 
ity of occurrence, and on successful es- 
cape. The average value of PcL for a 
direct earth abort using the LES is seen 
to be about 0.03. This average value is 
used in the effectiveness evaluation when 
the abort causing malfunction occurs with 
equal probability throughout the time 
interval. 
After the LES is jettisoned, the SM 
is used for a direct earth return. Follow- 
ing a safe escape, this abort mode is 
subjected to the following hazards: 
- Crew accelerations and spacecraft 
heating 
- Stability and control of the CM 
- Unplanned landing site up to thousands 
of miles downrange. 
Immediately following LES jettison, 
the conditional probability of crew loss, 
pcL resulting from a SM abort is essen- 
tially the same as that which existed just 
before LES jettison. At approximately 
500 seconds after launch, PcL decreases 
to zero, since earth orbit is achievable. 
Between these two limits PcL is assumed 
to remain constant. The increase in 
velocity and range to landing site due to 
longer flight times is offset by the extra 
time available for crew control of the CM. 
The value of PCL for SM abort is show-n on 
the Abort and Crew Risk Models, figures 
3-1 and 3-2. 
3.4 ESCAPE MODEL 
3.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this subsection is to 
illustrate several of the approaches which 
may be used in the development of escape 
models, and to provide an insight into 
some of the factors which must be taken 
into consideration. The primary objective 
of the models is to provide a measure of 
the warning, or lead time, required to 
safely escape from a hazardous condition 
aboard a launch vehicle. This information 
can then be applied to an evaluation of 
READ1 system effectiveness, by comparing 
the lead time required for escape with 
READI's capability to detect a hazardous 
condition and initiate an abort. 
So far as most vehicles including 
Saturn V are concerned, the escape problem 
can be divided into atmospheric and exo- 
atmospheric conditions. In the following 
paragraphs escape models are discussed for 
several representative types of hazardous 
conditions. These models are by no means 
inclusive, and the analysis is not strictly 
rigorous. They are presented simply as 
examples of the type of work which must be 
carried out for the particular situation 
under investigation. 
3.4.2 ATMOSPHERIC ESCAPE (SIC BOOST) 
3.4.2.1 General - It is assumed for the 
purpose of the model that escape during 
SIC boost will be accomplished using the 
LES. Although it may be possible to shut 
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down engines prematurely and stage to SII 
late in the boost, this method of abort 
will not be considered at this time. The 
two conditions requiring an escape 
attempt which were investigated are the 
following: 
- Imminent explosion hazard 
- Imminent vehicle break-up due to loss 
of thrust vector control. 
3.4.2.2 Explosion Hazard - A "safe escape" 
from an explosion hazard means that the 
crew and spacecraft have been removed 
sufficiently far from the center of the 
explosion to avoid any of its harmful 
effects. In many respects the explosion 
due to the propellants aboard Saturn V may 
be likened to a TNT explosion. Because of 
these similarities, and because of the 
lack of specific data on propellant ex- 
plosions, TNT equivalencies have been 
used in the explosion hazard analysis. 
Of the several effects produced by 
an explosion, including fireball, debris, 
etc., the one which is of primary concern 
is the accompanying blast (or shock) wave. 
It is generally accepted that an over- 
pressure of about 5 psi is the maximum 
which can be withstood by a structure such 
as the CMc3). Therefore, the LES must 
have sufficient warning time to accelerate 
and outdistance the shock wave as it 
travels outward from the center of the ex- 
plosion. The required warning time can 
be determined from a comparison of the 
distance-versus-time plots of the LES 
and the shock wave for a given set of 
conditions. 
For the purpose of the model, the 
following assumptions were made: 
------- 
(3)Refer to reference 3, Appendix C. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
An explosion aboard Saturn V will 
encompass the fuel aboard all three 
stages. This assumption effectively 
sets up a "worst case" condition. 
The equivalent TNT yield of SIC 
propellant (RP-1) is taken as 10 
percent, the equivalent TNT yields 
of SII and SIVB propellant (LOX, 
LH2) is assumed to be 60 percent. (3) 
Using the above, the explosive yield 
prior to liftoff is equivalent to 
about 0.56 kiloton of TNT, centered 
at a point approximately 150 feet 
below the LES. 
The path of the shock wave due to an ex- 
plosion with the equivalent TNT yield of 
(3) above is shown in figure 3-3.(4) It 
can be seen that an overpressure of 5 psi 
extends to a distance of over 1200 feet 
and arrives at that point approximately 
0.65 second after the explosion has oc- 
curred. The LES flight path is also shown 
on figure 3-3. It is evident that a lead 
time of about 2.5 seconds is needed if the 
LES is to escape the 5 psi overpressure 
shock wave caused by an explosion on the 
launch pad. The time required for the LES 
engine to reach go-percent thrust after 
the abort command has been initiated 
(reaction time) is assumed to be 200 milli- 
seconds. The READ1 system will make a 
decision to abort within a negligible time 
(about 10 milliseconds) after sensing the 
malfunction. The LES flight path is ap- 
proximate, being calculated simply from 
the expression: 
d = do + 1/2 + t2 
--mm--- 
(4)Refer to reference 4, Appendix C. 
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where 
d = straight line distance from the 
center of the explosion 
do = initial separation (150 feet) 
t = time after 90% thrust is reached 
g = gravitational constant 
W = weight of the LES, CM, and crew, 
assumed to be 16,700 lbs 
T = thrust of LES motor, assumed to 
average 15'5,000 lbs for the first 
1.5 seconds of burn, 65,700 lbs 
for the remaining 6.5 seconds. 
The effect of gravity was neglected be- 
cause of the extremely high thrust-to- 
weight ratio of the LESS 
Figure 3-3 shows that a lead time of 
2.5 seconds is required to escape from an 
explosion on the launch pad. This lead 
time is reduced if the explosion occurs 
some time after launch, so that the chance 
of escaping the overpressure hazard is 
increased. However, this does not neces- 
sarily mean that the probability of crew 
survival is greater, since other factors 
such as vehicle stability and orientation 
must be taken into account. 
As the flight time of the vehicle 
increases, several factors act to reduce 
the blast hazard from which the spacecraft 
must escape. The most obvious is that 
the potential explosive yield is being re- 
duced as the propellants are consumed. A 
second factor is that the altitude of the 
vehicle is continually increasing. The 
resulting decrease in ambient pressure 
effectively reduces the range to which 
the critical 5 psi overpressure extends. 
Another effect of increased altitude is 
to reduce the velocity of the shock wave 
front, thereby increasing the arrival time 
of the damaging overpressure. A third fac- 
tor which aids the escape from an explosion 
is the increase in vehicle velocity after 
launch. If it is assumed that the explod- 
ing mass and the resulting shock wave have 
no forward velocity at the instant of 
detonation, the LES will be moving away 
from the explosion with the velocity it 
had attained the instant before detonation. 
(This of course requires separation prior 
to the explosion.) At some point in time 
after launch, the vehicle velocity will 
equal the velocity of the expanding shock 
wave, and will therefore remain safely 
ahead of it. 
The results of the above discussion 
are summarized in figure 3-4, which shows 
the decrease in lead time required for 
safe escape as a function of increasing 
flight time. The minimum value of warning 
time is seen to be 0.8 second, which is the 
time required to separate and accelerate 
the LES so that a SO-foot separation 
"safety factor" exists between the LES and 
the Saturn V vehicle at the instant of 
explosion. 
3.4.2.3 Vehicle Breakup - In the example 
discussed below, vehicle breakup is con- 
sidered to be the result of a four engine 
hardover condition during SIC boost. Al- 
though the probability of occurrence of 
such a malfunction is admittedly small, it 
is worthy of consideration because of the 
ensuing catastrophic-type failure. The 
four engine hardover condition could be 
caused by a saturated error signal from 
either a rate gyro, control accelerometer, 
or attitude control signal. It is the in- 
tent of this discussion to determine the 
lead time required to escape from such a 
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condition, and to investigate methods of 
increasing the margin of safety. 
A study of the Saturn V vehicle 
dynamics following a four engine hardover 
malfunction indicates an extremely rapid 
divergence of attitude rate and angle of 
attack. This is illustrated by figure 
3-5, in which engine deflection angle (PI, 
pitch rate (i), and angle of attack (a) 
are plotted as a function of time follow- 
ing the malfunction. For illustrative 
purposes, the time of occurrence of the 
malfunction was chosen to be about 78 
seconds after launch. Since the vehicle 
is passing through the region of maximum 
dynamic pressure (Max Q) at this time, a 
worst case condition is established so 
far as the structural limits of the vehi- 
cle are concerned. For the purpose of 
constructing the model, the maximum allow- 
able angle of attack in the Max Q region 
is taken as 10 degrees; this value of a 
is based on the NASA Crew Safety Panel 
studiesc3) and other documentation. (2) 
The warning time available for escape 
depends upon the method used to sense the 
effects of the four engine hardover mal- 
function. One method of accomplishing 
this might be measurements of the engine 
deflection angle, p, and its derivative. 
As shown by figure 3-5, these quantities 
could be measured accurately within a 
very short time of the malfunction. (It 
should be noted at this point that al- 
though the malfunction occurs at t = 0, 
the engine gimbal system has an inherent 
time lag of about 100 milliseconds due to 
fluid compressibility.) This method of 
detecting the hardover condition could 
provide a warning time of approximately 
0.7 second before the critical angle of 
- - - - - - - 
(2) and (3) Refer to references 2 and 3, 
Appendix C. 
attack is exceeded. This warning time is 
reduced to about 0.5 second if the pitch 
angle rate is used as an indication of the 
malfunction, and further reduced to 0.13 
second if an angle of attack sensqr is 
employed. 
It is evident that, regardless of the 
quantity being sensed, the red-line limits 
of the malfunction detector must be set 
above the normal operating range of the 
variable in order to reduce the possibility 
of a false alarm. However, the longer one 
waits to insure that the four engine hard- 
over condition actually exists, the shorter 
the warning time becomes. Thus, tradeoffs 
must be made between the time available 
for an escape attempt and the probability 
of a false alarm. It should be noted that 
the false alarm probability can be reduced 
substantially by the judicious use of sig- 
nal and information redundancy. Also, 
processing circuitry can be used to filter 
out the effects produced by non-hazardous 
transient conditions. 
One of the possible remedial actions 
which READ1 might take in the event of a 
four engine hardover condition would be to 
shut down all engines and initiate abort. 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of 
various READ1 detection techniques and 
decisions, it is necessary to establish a 
relationship between SIC engine shut down 
and the resulting increase in warning time. 
Referring to figure 3-5, it may be seen 
that, following a hardover signal, the 
engine deflection angle (p) increases to 
its limit of 5 degrees at the rate of 10 
degrees/second. This of course applies a 
continually increasing turning moment to 
the vehicle, as shown by the dashed line 
of figure 3-6. This moment can be reduced 
and consequently the turning rate of the 
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vehicle lessened, by shutting down the 
engines. Curve A on figure 3-6 shows the 
decrease in the moment if the engine cut- 
off command is given 0.6 second after the 
malfunction has occurred. The shape of 
this curve is essentially the F-l engine 
thrust decay characteristic. By reducing 
the delay time between the occurrence of 
the malfunction and the engine cutoff 
command, the curves of B, C, and D result. 
Curve D indicates a delay of zero time. 
Although this is not physically realizable, 
it may be possible to initiate engine cut- 
off with very little delay. As mentioned 
previously, the cause of the four engine 
hardover malfunction is electrical in 
nature. Therefore, it may be possible to 
sense the saturated gyro or accelerometer 
error signal directly rather than waiting 
to detect its effect on pitch rate or 
angle of attack. 
The areas under the curves of fig- 
ure 3-6 are proportional to the integrated 
moment acting to turn the vehicle and in- 
crease the angle of attack. As the area 
decreases, a longer time is required to 
reach the critical value of a, thereby in- 
creasing the available lead time. This 
is shown by the curves of figure 3-7, in 
which the helpful results of engine shut- 
down are clearly evident. If the hardover 
condition can be detected almost immedi- 
ately and the engines shut down, several 
seco.nds are available for escape before 
the critical angle of attack is reached. 
As the delay time for engine shutdown in- 
creases, the available warning time de- 
creases accordingly. If it is assumed 
thatanexplosion occurs at the instant of 
breakup, then the maximum delay which 
could be tolerated in shutting down the 
engines is about 0.3 second. This would 
provide a warning time of approximately 
0.8 second, which is the minimum required 
to escape from an explosion. 
3.4.3 EXO-ATMOSPHERIC ESCAPE 
The escape model is significantly 
affected by the different conditions which 
exist during atmospheric and exo-atmospheric 
flight. It is instructive to examine some 
of these differences briefly at the outset. 
One of the more important factors is that 
the LES is jettisoned early during exo- 
atmospheric flight, and therefore is not 
available for use as an escape vehicle. 
As a result, escape during most of the 
SII boost, for example, must be accomplished 
by staging to either the SIVB or the SM. 
Unlike escape with the LES, staging re- 
quires engine shutdown and separation 
before the engines of the SIVB or SM can 
be ignited. This will be discussed more 
fully in the following paragraphs. 
A second important difference is that 
once the vehicle is "outside" the atmos- 
phere (above 150,000 ft), the very low air 
density precludes the propagation of a 
shock wave. Therefore, the danger of a 
damaging overpressure exists only in the 
immediate vicinity of the explosion. Be- 
cause of the lower air density, the thermal 
energy which is radiated is deposited over 
a much larger volume than would be the 
case had the explosion occurred in the 
atmosphere. As a result, the hazard due 
to destructive fireball temperatures can 
be neglected a short distance from the 
explosion. 
A third distinction between atmos- 
pheric and exo-atmospheric escape condi- 
tions is that once outside the atmosphere, 
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the vehicle is not subjected to such high 
dynamic pressures, so that the danger of 
structural breakup is reduced. 
From the above, the following criteri- 
on may be established to define safe es- 
cape under exo-atmospheric conditions. 
If, at the instant of catastrophic failure, 
the escape vehicle has separated a dis- 
tance of 100 feet from the boost stage, a 
high probability of successful escape 
exists. The value of 100 feet is somewhat 
arbitrary, and was chosen primarily for 
the purpose of illustrating the Escape 
Model. Having established the above cri- 
terion, the required lead times may be 
determined, using escape during SII boost 
as an example. 
Figure 3-8 shows the normal SII and 
SIVB separation sequence which was used 
in construction of the model. It can be 
seen that a delay of about 1.3 seconds ex- 
ists between the abort decision and the 
SIVB engine start signal. A straight line 
approximati.on was used to represent the 
J-2 engine thrust buildup characteristic. 
For the first second after the start sig- 
nal no appreciable thrust is generated. 
During the next 2.5 seconds the thrust in- 
creases linearly to the rated value. Since 
virtually no thrust is produced for the 
first second following the start signal, 
a delay of 2.3 seconds exists during which 
there is no separation of escape vehicle 
and booster except for that produced by 
ullage and retrorocket firing. The build- 
up of separation distance following J-2 
engine ignition is shown in figure 3-9. 
The figure shows that nearly four seconds 
have elapsed before the J-2 engine reaches 
mainstage, at that point more than five 
seconds are required to achieve a separa- 
tion of 100 feet. The escape path using 
the SM as the escape vehicle is also shown 
on figure 3-9. Although the SM engine 
reaches full thrust within 100 milliseconds 
of the start signal, the lower thrust-to- 
weight ratio prevents much of a reduction 
in the required warning time. 
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SECTION IV 
STAGE PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION MODELS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
As discussed in subsection 2.3, 
alternate mission capability,of Section 
II, non-catastrophic propulsion failures 
may result in degraded but useful mission 
performance. The propulsion failure 
effects can be related to mission perform- 
ance through a set of performance curves 
or "maps". Typically, one set of perform- 
ance curves is developed for each stage 
of a multistage vehicle. These curves 
are plots of one specific performance 
parameter versus time-of-occurence of the 
given malfunction. The performance model 
serves to convert the various failure 
effects into equivalent variations of the 
basic parameter. For this study, the 
normalized usable residual propellant in 
100 nm orbit (MpRR) was taken as the 
basic parameter. The performance models 
can, therefore, be used in conjunction 
with figure 2-2, which shows the alternate 
mission capability as a function of MpRN. 
The effect of various malfunctions upon 
stage performance is summarized by the 
stage performance maps, figure 4-l and 
figures 4-3 through 4-7. 
The three stages of the Saturn V 
vehicle present the same problems, with 
varying degrees of complexity, to the 
development of Stage Performance Degrada- 
tion Models. This makes the Saturn V 
particularly amenable to model solution, 
since a single approach can be developed 
and then modified and expanded, where 
necessary, to account for the problems of 
the individual stages. This method will 
become evident in the following 
subsections. 
4.2 SIVB STAGE PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION 
The SIVB flight takes place outside 
the atmosphere in near-orbital conditions. 
Because of this, it was possible to use a 
simplified set of equations to represent 
the SIVB flight path and to determine the 
effect of various malfunctions upon the 
residual propellant in 100 nm orbit. 
Unlike the SII and SIC performance degrada- 
tion models, the equations used in the 
SIVB model do not require iterative inte- 
gration techniques for their solution when 
malfunction disturbances are introduced. 
The normalization processes used in the 
model development tended to cancel the 
majority of error introduced by the 
simplifying assumptions, since the value 
of normal residual propellant was cal- 
culated using the same techniques and 
assumptions. 
Since the SIVB flight is exo- 
atmospheric and nearly horizontal (assum- 
ing nominal SIC and SIT boost),the gravity 
component loss was neglected and the 
single AV relation shown below was used to 
describe the flight characteristics of 
interest: 
AV = Vex &n 
c 3 
32 t 
Mf 
----_-- 
t See Appendix B for an explanation of 
terms. 
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The use of this simplified equation 
yields an error of about 5 percent over 
the full SIVB trajectory, compared to the 
nominal trajectory computed by NASA. (5) 
This error is partially compensated for 
by using the same relation for normal as 
well as malfunction computations, and by 
dividing to obtain the desired ratio of 
MPR to MPPN. 
The following three types of malfunc- 
tions were investigated using the SIVB 
model to determine their effect upon the 
residual propellant in 100 nm orbit: 
(1) Engine out during second burn 
(2) Propellant utilization system 
locked at f 10 percent 
(a) During first and second burn 
(b) During second burn only 
*(3) Leaks (oxidizer or fuel) - 3$, 12$, 
36% of normal tankage flow 
(a) From launch to start of first 
burn 
(b) During first burn 
(c) During second burn. 
The effects of these malfunctions are 
shown in figure 4-1, SIVB Performance 
Maps, where the time-of-occurrence of the 
malfunction is plotted against MPR and 
MpRN, the ratio of the residual propellant 
under malfunction conditions to the normal 
residual propellant. As an example, 
consider the effect of a 12-percent 
oxidizer leak which occurs halfway through 
first burn. The performance map shows 
(5)Refer to reference 5, Appendix C. 
*The leak is assumed to be trivial dur- 
ing the orbital coast period. If this 
is not the case, MORN is zero for all 
leaks greater than 2.0 percent. 
that the residual propellant MpR available 
in 100 nm orbit will be 91 percent of the 
normal value. An examination of figure 
2-2, Alternate Mission Capability, indi- 
cates that although the prime mission is 
not achievable under these conditions, a 
lunar orbit mission can be accomplished. 
This example illustrates how the Stage 
Performance and Mission Models are used to 
relate the effect of a specific malfunction 
to a relative mission loss value to be 
used in READ1 evaluation. 
Since the malfunctions under con- 
sideration fall into three different time 
periods - launch to first burn, first burn, 
and second burn, the basic AV equation for 
the SIVB stage was modified accordingly. 
The equations and definitions of the terms 
used in them are presented in Appendix B. 
4.3 SII STAGE PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION 
MODEL 
The SII Performance Degradation Model 
is comprised of a set of integral equations 
of motion, together with mass flow and 
control equations. These equations are 
integrated by a simple stepwise iteration 
technique, with the appropriate malfunction 
effects being introduced at the selected 
time of occurrence, t*. The performance 
data for the SII (and SIC) stage was 
obtained from a computer simulation of the 
stage dynamics described by the equation 
set. The flow chart used forthecomputer 
program is shown in figure 4-2. The ro- 
gram itself was run on a UNIVAC 1107. & 
The SII equations are integrated from 
the nominal starting conditions of altitude 
(Ho), altitude rate (Ho), and velocity 
(VJ/o) which correspond to the nominal SIC 
cutoff conditions, until either fuel or 
oxidizer depletion is achieved. The 
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program then "stages" to SIVB, using the 
end points of SII as the initial condi- 
tions, and integrates the SIVB equations 
until either orbital velocity or propel- 
lant depletion is reached. The residual 
propellant so obtained is then divided 
by the nominal value of propellant in 
orbit (obtained from a similar integration 
process, with no failure in SII) to 
derive MpP/MpRN. 
In order to obtain sufficient data 
points for curve plotting, the equations 
were solved for the malfunction occurring 
at 40-second intervals. A four-second 
iteration interval was used. 
The SII equation set contains an 
approximation to the propellant utiliza- 
tion system. The SII stage is biased 
oxidizer rich at the start to obtain a 
high thrust condition at the beginning 
of stage burn. The propellant utilization 
equations act to maintain a high oxidizer/ 
fuel (O/F) ratio in order to reduce the 
oxidizer bias and achieve the nominal 
O/F ratio required for simultaneous pro- 
pellant depletion. At some point during 
stage burn this ratio is attained, 
resulting in a high specific impulse 
condition until the end of the burn. The 
guidance program is an heuristic approx- 
imation to the normal trajectory. The 
main approximation is that the program 
tries to attain the normal altitude-time 
trajectory at the expense of the velocity- 
time trajectory. 
For the purpose of the model, the 
effect of a malfunction such as leakage in 
the lox bootstrap line, for example, is 
expressed in terms of changes to three 
basic parameters: 
- Change in oxidizer flow (a) 
- Change in fuel flow (fi) 
- Change in thrust (y). 
The magnitude of the changes to these 
parameters is based upon the results of 
the J-2 engine analog computer simulation 
studies which are described in detail in 
Section V of this report. Thus, the 
performance characteristics of the SII 
stage were investigated for parameter 
variations which represent- realistic mal- 
functions having a relatively high prob- 
ability of occurrence. The combinations 
of parameter variations utilized in the 
SII stage computer program are given in 
table 4-l. 
Table 4-l. SII PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION INPUT DATA 
Change in Change in 
Effect of Oxidizer Fuel Flow Change in 
Run No. Malfunction Flow (a) ($1 Thrust (y) 
1 1 engine out -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
2 45% loss in -0.02' -0.08 -0.05 
fuel turbopump 
efficiency 
3 35% loss in -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
engine thrust 
4 505 engine leak 0 +0.1 0 
(fuel) 
--. . . . -_ 
,~~~~.,,~.,_,,,,..,..,, ,,. m.,m.,,, .-.. . ..* ._.. . . . __. . . ..--. ---.--- 
-_- ____.,C__.. 
I, II-I.. I 
Table 4-l. SII PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION INPUT DATA (Cant> 
Hun No. 
Effect of 
Malfunction 
Change in Change in 
Oxidizer Fuel Flow 
Flow (a) (B) 
Change in 
Thrust (y) 
50% engine leak 
(oxidizer) 
20% engine leak 
(oxidizer) 
20% engine leak 
(fuel) 
15% loss in 
engine thrust 
+0.1 0 0 
+0.04 0 0 
0 +0.04 0 
0 0 -0.03 
The results of the computer runs are 
plotted on the SII Performance Maps, 
figures 4-3 and 4-4. For reference, the 
fraction of normal residual propellant 
needed to achieve prime mission is indi- 
cated. This can be used as a measure of 
the relative sensitivity of stage per- 
formance to different combinations of 
parameter variations. 
The equations and terms used in the 
SII Stage Performance Model are included 
in Appendix B. 
4.4 SIC STAGE PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION 
MODEL 
The SIC Performance Degradation 
Model is a modification of the one used 
for the SII stage. Since the SIC trajec- 
tory is almost completely within the 
atmosphere, an extensive section has been 
added to compute approximations to the 
drag terms and the variation of thrust 
with altitude. A fairly simple exponential 
relation was used for thrust variation 
which gives a good match to the F-l thrust- 
time curve for normal flight. Some form 
of hold or delay on the turning rate was 
required for longer-than-normal SIC 
burns (1 engine out) to prevent complete 
turnover. A proportional angular rate 
guidance technique was used which slows 
the turning rate proportional to varia- 
tions in the predicted burn time, which 
in turn is computed from the remaining 
propellant mass. The propellant utiliza- 
tion system approximation is not carried 
over from SII, since this type of system 
is not used by the SIC stage. 
Malfunctions were entered into the 
model by the same three parameters (a, fi, 
y) as were used in SII. Data points were 
taken for malfunctions introduced during 
successive runs at 24-second intervals 
after launch. The computation technique 
for deriving MpHN is the same as used in 
SII, but at the end of SIC burn (propel- 
lant depletion), a malfunction-free run 
is made on the SII and SIVB stages to 
obtain the residual propellant in orbit. 
The end point of the malfunctioned SIC 
burn is taken as the starting point of 
the SII burn, that is, 
. . 
Hos11 = HcoSIC 
Hos11 = HcoSIC 
V 
OS11 
=v 
cosIc 
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where The input data set used with this model 
AcoSIC = cutoff value of variable A is given in table 4-2. from SIC 
Aos11 = starting value of variable A for SII. 
Table 4-2. SIC PERFORMANCE INPUT DATA SET 
Run No. 
Effect of 
Malfunction 
l/2 engine out -0.1 
1 engine out -0.2 
2 engines out -0.4 
50% engine leak (ox) +O.l 
25% engine leak (ox) +0.05 
50% engine leak (fuel) 0 
25% engine leak (fuel) 0 
50% engine thrust loss 0 
25% engine thrust loss 0 
The effect of these malfunctions upon the MpR is affected by different propellant 
SIC stage performance is summarized in leaks, and figure 4-7 relates thrust losses 
the Stage Performance Maps. Figure 4-5 to MpR. The equations used in the SIC 
shows the effect on MpR of various engine Stage Performance Model are given in 
out conditions. Figure 4-6 indicates how Appendix B. 
Change in 
Oxidizer 
Flow (a) 
Change in 
Fuel Flow 
(B) 
-0.1 
-0.2 
-0.4 
0 
0 
+0.1 
40.05 
0 
0 
Change in 
Thrust (y) 
-0.1 
-0.2 
-0.4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-0.1 
-0.05 
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SECTION V 
ENGINE AND SUBSYSTEM MALFUNCTION MODEL 
5.1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
There are several Saturn V vehicle 
subsystems that are of interest to this 
READ1 investigation. The J-2 engine was 
selected as the most appropriate of these 
for intensive study and development of a 
malfunction model. This choice was based 
upon two primary factors: 
- Relative complexity of S-2 engine 
as compared to other subsystem: The 
J-2 engine is employed in both SII 
and SIVB stages. Although the basic 
engine is the same, there are 
variations in interface and environ- 
mental details that affect the READ1 
system design. In addition, the 
engine restart requirement in the 
SIVB stage contributes additional 
failure modes and increases overall 
criticality. 
- Availability of mathematical model: 
The development of a dynamic model 
of the J-2 engine was in progress by 
the Propulsion and Vehicle Engineer- 
ing Laboratory of the George C. 
Marshall Space Flight Center. Mod- 
ification of this model, which was 
designed for analog computer simula- 
tion, permitted study of both 
transient and steady-state malfunc- 
tions in considerable depth. 
This section contains details of the 
dynamic model and discusses the results 
of an extensive analog computer simulation 
program that was undertaken to evaluate 
the utility of this type of model to the 
READ1 design procedure. The analog com- 
puter simulation approach was chosen 
because the engine mathematical model is 
too complex for rigorous theoretical 
analyses of malfunctions. 
The results of this analog computer 
simulation program have been of great 
value in the following areas of interest: 
5.2 
Determination of the effects of 
steady-state malfunctions on mission 
model input variables .- 
Study of remedial actions for steady- 
state and transient malfunctions 
Investigation of malfunction detec- 
tion methods 
Evaluation of stochastic variations 
in parameters. 
J-2 ENGINE MODEL 
The mathematical model of the J-2 
engine that is described here was used 
for analog computer simulation of malfunc- 
tion effects and remedies. It was devel- 
oped by the Marshall Space Flight Center 
for studies of the J-2 engine start 
transient and has been modified to permit 
its use for malfunction analysis. Figure 
5-l is a simplified engine schematic 
diagram that shows the relationship of the 
engine components that are represented by 
the model. It also shows the locations 
of the various types of leaks that are 
included in the subsequent discussion of 
steady-state malfunctions. 
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The complete set of model equations 
and functions is contained in Appendix A. 
This model defines the dynamic behavior 
of the propellant pressures and flow 
rates and the turbopump speeds as func- 
tions of the engine valve positions and 
propellant tank pressures. Valve control 
and vehicle dynamics are not included in 
the model. In the simulation work, the 
engine valve positions were treated as 
arbitrary functions of time. Propellant 
tank pressures and temperatures were 
assumed to be constant. Figure A-2 of 
Appendix A shows what was. considered to 
be the normal valve operation sequence. 
The modifications that were intro- 
duced into the original start transient 
model have been chiefly concerned with 
improving the capability of simulating 
off-nominal conditions. These modifica- 
tions have included such items as low O/F 
mixture ratio limits on gas generator 
ignition and combustion, the alternative 
methods of-computing turbine flows and 
the inclusion of the propellant prevalves 
in the shutdown sequence. It was, of 
course, also necessary to use various 
methods of introducing the perturbing 
malfunctions into the model. These can 
generally be categorized as liquid leaks, 
gas leaks, decreased pump efficiencies, 
or discrete changes in the valve sequences. 
There are limitations associated with 
this model, chiefly stemming from the fact 
that it was developed to approximate the 
performance of a normal engine. In 
principle, the constant coefficients of 
the model could be replaced by nonlinear 
functions wherever necessary for simula- 
tion of off-design operation. In practice, 
lack of test data for these conditions 
has rendered this impractical. 
5.3 STEADY-STATE MALFUNCTION EFFECTS 
The effects of various steady-state 
malfunctions on engine performance were 
studied in order to determine values of 
engine performance degradation parameters 
that should be used as inputs for the Stage 
Performance Degradation Model discussed in 
Section IV. The general procedure was to 
introduce a malfunction of variable magni- 
tude into the engine simulation and in- 
crease its size until some critical 
effect was produced. Steady-state engine 
performance was recorded for several mal- 
function amplitudes. From these data, the 
performance degradation parameters corre- 
sponding to the critical level of the mal- 
function were computed. 
The performance degradation is 
expressed by a set of three normalized 
parameters, which represent changes in 
propellant consumption and thrust; these 
parameters are defined as follows: 
Net change in oxidizer flow 
a = Normal oxidizer flow 
P= Net change in fuel flow Normal fuel flow 
Change in thrust , which is 
y = Normal thrust 
Change in main chamber pressure 
n Normal main chamber pressure 
The malfunctions that were examined 
are tabulated in table S-1, which shows 
the critical size of the malfunction, the 
nature of the critical effect and the 
values of the three performance parameters 
that correspond to the critical size. 
Table 5-l. STEADY-STATE MALFUNCTION EFFECTS 
Malfunction Figure Critical Size Critical Effect (Lox=Flow) (FuelsFloW) (Thrzst) 
Lox Turbopump; Loss 
of Efficiency 
Fuel Turbopump; Loss 
of Efficiency 
s-2 
s-3 
*'lL = 0.54 rlL 
nqF = 0.302 qF 
No critical 
effects for 
maximum flow 
through valve. 
LFBv = 0.415 MF 
LL1 = 1.07 ML1 
LF1 = 1.42 MFl 
LF2 = 0.395 MF~ 
LG1 = 0.54 MG1 
L G2 = 0.47 MC2 
Low gas generator 
mixture ratio 
-0.495 +0.040 
High gas generator 
temperature and fuel 
pump stall 
-0.080 -0.360 
-0.392 
-0.195 
Lox Bleed Valve 
Leakage to Lox Tank 
Fuel Bleed Valve 
Leakage to Fuel Tank 
Lox Bootstrap Line 
Leakage 
Fuel Bootstrap Line 
Leakage 
Gaseous Fuel Leakage 
from Injector 
Manifold 
Hot Gas Leakage 
from Gas Generator 
Hot Gas Leakage 
from Manifold 
between Turbines 
5-4 
5-5 
5-6 
5-7 
5-8 
5-9 
s-10 
High gas generator 
temperature 
Low gas generator 
mixture ratio 
High gas generator 
temperature 
High main chamber 
mixture ratio 
Fuel pump stall -0.380 -0.420 
Low gas generator 
mixture ratio 
Performance Parameters for 
Malfunction of Critical Size 
-0.078 -0.370 -0.195 
-0.025 -0.030 -0.035 
-0.065 -0.065 -0.085 
-0.030 +0.025 -0.165 
-0.490 +0.035 
-0.400 
-0.400 
Two general types of malfunctions are 
included. One type is a loss of turbopump 
efficiency, which might be due to in- 
creased axial loads resulting from 
abnormal balance-cavity pressures. In 
these cases, the critical sizes are 
expressed as functions of the normal 
turbopump efficiencies. The second type 
of malfunction is leakage from the various 
locations indicated in figure 5-l. Here, 
the critical sizes are expressed as func- 
tions of the normal flows through the 
ducts or lines from which the leakage 
emanates. Table 5-l also indicates a 
reference illustration, figures 5-2 
through 5-14 for each malfunction. These 
illustrations show the variation of the 
three performance parameters and the 
critical variable for each malfunction. 
In figures 5-4 and 5-5, which show 
the effects of lox and fuel bleed valve 
leakage, the leakage size corresponding 
to full valve opening is indicated. In 
figure s-10., which shows the effects of 
hot gas leakage from the manifold that 
connects the fuel turbine exhaust with 
the lox turbine inlet, the leakage 
equivalent to a fully opened lox turbine 
bypass valve is noted. 
5.4 REMEDIAL ACTION DEVELOPMENT 
The analog simulation of the engine 
was employed in studying remedial actions 
for various types of malfunctions. A 
number of these are listed in table 5-2, 
with comments on the effectiveness of the 
attempted action. For the most part, 
this group of malfunctions is composed of 
various valve failures, and the appro- 
priate remedies consist of modifying the 
operation of other valves in order to 
mitigate the effects of the malfunction. 
In the case of fuel pump stall,the require- 
ment is to anticipate the malfunction and 
take action.to avoid it. Since this is 
primarily a measurement problem, it is 
discussed in greater detail in subsection 
5.5 Malfunction Detection Techniques. 
Figure 5-11 illustrates the effectiveness 
of the remedial action. 
In table 5-2, the critical effects 
noted for starting with either the lox or 
fuel bleed valves open do not include the 
probable structural failure of the 
recirculation lines that lead back to the 
tanks (in the SII and SIVB stages of the 
Saturn V), due to exposing them to 
abnormally high pressures. These lines 
were excluded from the engine model since 
they are part of the stage. Any remedial 
actions considered for these malfunctions 
must take the structural considerations 
into account. 
Table 'j-2 is not, of course, a com- 
plete listing of all the engine malfunc- 
tions for which remedial actions are 
available, but includes those cases where 
the simulation of the engine dynamics was 
of importance in evaluating the effects of 
the remedies. 
5.5 MALFUNCTION DETECTION TECHNIQUES 
The analog simulation of the engine 
has been used to considerable advantage in 
determining methods of sensing malfunctions. 
One evidence of this is in the anticipa- 
tion of fuel pump stall, the results of 
which are shown in figure 5-11. Since the 
engine model defined the stall region as 
that where the ratio of volumetric flow 
through the fuel pump to fuel pump speed 
was too low, this ratio was chosen as the 
basis for the detection system. It had 
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Table 5-2. REMEDIAL ACTIONS INVESTIGATED FOR VARIOUS TRANSIENT MALFUNCTIONS 
Malfunction 
Stalling of Fuel Turbopump 
during Normal Engine Start 
Transient 
Start with Lox Bleed 
Valve Open 
Start with Fuel Bleed 
Valve Open 
Ln Start with Lox Turbine I Bypass Valve in Closed 
F (Mainstage) Position 
Failure of Lox Turbine 
Bypass Valve to go from 
Open (Start) to Close 
(Mainstage) Position 
During Start 
Failure of Main Lox 
Valve to Open Beyond 
First Step 
Main Lox Valve Goes 
Full Open at Once 
Instead of Stopping 
at First Step 
Critical Effect 
Lox rich combustion 
due to loss of fuel 
flow 
Engine will not 
bootstrap due to 
low lox pump 
pressure 
Lox rich combustion 
in gas generator due 
to low fuel pump 
pressure 
Lox rich combustion 
due to rapid 
acceleration of lox 
turbopump 
Marginally low O/F 
mixture ratio in gas 
generator 
Lox rich combustion 
in gas operator due 
to high lox pump 
discharge pressure 
Fuel pump stall due 
to increased main 
chamber pressure 
Remedial Action Attempted 
Modulation of fuel bleed 
valve as a function of 
fuel flow and pump speed 
Modulation of fuel bleed 
valve as a function of 
fuel pump discharge 
pressure and pump speed 
Delay opening of main 
lox valve to aid build- 
up of lox pressure 
Do not open main lox 
valve beyond first 
step. Introduce flow 
restrictor in lox 
bootstrap line 
Delay second step opening 
of main lox valve. 
Temporarily restrict flow 
in lox bootstrap line 
Close propellant 
utilization valve after 
lox turbine bypass valve 
fail to operate normally 
Keep lox turbine bypass 
valve in open (start) 
position 
Modulation of fuel bleed 
valve as a function of 
fuel flow and pump speed 
Assessmentof Remedial Action 
Effective in avoiding stall 
region during start. See 
figure 5-11 
Equally effective 
Undesirable. Causes exces- 
sively lox rich combustion 
in gas generator 
Can achieve low thrust (40% 
of normal) operating 
condition 
Effective in avoiding lox 
rich combustion during 
start. Main lox valve must 
be opened and flow restrictor 
removed when lox turbopump 
speed reaches normal opera- 
ting level or overspeed will 
result 
Gas generator mixture ratio 
somewhat improved. (Effect 
of malfunction is reduced 
by approximately 25%) 
Gas generator mixture ratio 
near normal. Main chamber 
mixture ratio very low. 
Thrust approximately 45% of 
normal 
Stall is avoided, but gas 
generator O/F mixture ratio 
becomes critically low, main 
chamber mixture ratio is 
excessively lox rich, engine 
will not bootstrap 
Table 5-2. REMEDIAL ACTIONS INVESTIGATED FOR VARIOUS TRANSIENT MALFUNCTIONS (Cont) 
Malfunction Critical Effect Remedial Action Attempted Assessment of Remedial Action 
Main Lox Valve Fails to Lox rich combustion Reopen main fuel valve, Effective if closure of main 
Close at Cutoff after main fuel then shut down with fuel valve is arrested and 
valve closes prevalues reversed before it closes 
more than halfway - other- 
wise fuel pump stalls 
Loss of Start Tank 
Pressure 
No turbopump start- Tank head start Undesirable. Causes exces- 
ing flow sively lox rich combustion 
in the gas generator 
to be assumed that the ratio could not be 
directly calculated, since the fuel flow- 
meter location is such that it does not 
measure the fuel that flows to the gas 
generator or through the fuel bleed 
valve. Consequently, the detection 
scheme shown in figure 5-12 was adopted. 
The fuel bleed valve position was used to 
modify the decision computation and a 
smoothing network was introduced to avoid 
instability due to high frequency over- 
shoots in the measured flow when the bleed 
valve operated. 
As noted in the list of remedial 
actions in table 5-2, an alternative fuel 
pump stall anticipation method was devel- 
oped. This was based upon the fact that 
the stall region could equally well be 
defined as a high ratio of fuel pump 
pressure head to the square of pump speed. 
By using techniques similar to those 
described above , an equally effective 
system was synthesized from measurements 
of the pump pressures and speed. 
Another illustration of detection 
techniques is the comparison of the fuel 
and lox turbopump speeds to determine the 
position of the lox turbine bypass valve 
during the start transient. This 
determination is required as an inde- 
pendent check on the valve position switch 
indication. If the valve has malfunc- 
tioned so that it is in the closed (main- 
stage) position during the start, the lox 
turbine will accelerate too rapidly and 
cause excessively lox rich combustion. 
Figure 5-13 shows how the fuel and lox 
turbopump speeds compare during the dis- 
charge of the start tank, with the lox 
turbine bypass valve either opened or 
closed. There is a brief period in which 
the relative speeds of the two pumps may 
be used to decide whether to continue with 
the start or to shutdown the engine. 
Steady-state leakage conditions can 
usually be most readily distinguished by 
pressure drop measurements. Figure S-14 
shows how several fuel measurements vary 
as a function of gaseous fuel leakage from 
the fuel injector manifold. The fuel 
injector pressure drop is more sensitive 
to the leakage than any other parameter. 
Normal or slightly increased fuel flow- 
meter output can be utilized in conjunction 
with the low injector pressure drop to 
provide a unique indication of a leak. 
Reference to figure 5-8 shows that this 
leakage may be considered critical at a 
rate of 39 percent of normal flow. This 
criticality is based upon a high main 
chamber mixture ratio, rather than any 
attendant fire hazard which was not 
considered in the model. The appropriate 
remedial action is to open the propellant 
utilization valve at the lowest practical 
detection level, in order to keep the 
main chamber mixture ratio as near normal 
as possible. If the leakage approaches 
the critical level, engine shutdown is 
required. 
5.6 STOCHASTIC EFFECTS ON MEASURED 
PARAMETERS 
The engine operation parameters that 
would be measured for purposes of malfunc- 
tion detection are subject to some varia- 
tions during normal engine running. The 
influence of these variations on the 
detection problem is treated in Section 
VII, Malfunction Sensing Model. A 
knowledge of the magnitude of these varia- 
tions is desirable in order to completely 
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define a detection system; however, no 
statistical data on the J-2 engine per- 
formance have beenavailable during this 
study. 
Variations in engine operation may 
either be due to external conditions such 
as propellant tank temperatures and 
pressures and the ambient atmospheric 
pressure, or they may result internally 
from differences in the physical param- 
eters of the engines. Examples of these 
differences might be variations in the 
areas of valves and ducts, or in the 
geometry of turbine blades. The engine 
manufacturer publishes influence coeffi- 
cients that define the effects of the 
external conditions, but there is no 
similar information on the influence of 
the internal parameters. Consequently, 
various constants in the engine analog 
model were perturbed, one at a time, in 
order to obtain a set of influence coeffi- 
cients. These are presented in table 5-3 
and represent the values derived from 
perturbations that affected the most 
sensitive engine measurements by approx- 
imately 10 percent. Since the engine 
model equations are nonlinear, these 
influence coefficients may be expected to 
vary with the size of the perturbation. 
In order to provide some indication 
of the magnitude of J-2 engine performance 
variations, the qualification test logbook 
data for three production engines were 
examined. Since each set of test data 
included engine performance measurements 
that were corrected to standard environ- 
mental conditions, a comparison of these 
measurements should be indicative of the 
effects of internal engine variations. 
One-sigma variances for a number of 
measurements were therefore computed and 
normalized as ratios of the average 
measurement. These are listed in table 
5-4. As a comparison, this table includes 
some similar data on the RL-10 engine.* 
These,RL-1Cdata werebased on measurements 
that had been corrected to standard 
environmental conditions and also to 
standard engine mixture ratio. 
Table 5-4 also shows normalized 
variances in the analog computer simula- 
tion of various engine measurements. 
These indicate that the simulation was 
more consistent than the actual engines. 
*The RL-10 engine dataweretaken from 
"Tables I, II, and III, Flight Instru- 
mentation Corrected Data, Average and 
Three Sigma, for RLlOA-3S, RLlOA-3C, and 
RLlOA-3-1 Delivery Engines", issued by 
Pratt and Whitney, and supplied by NASA. 
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Table 5-3. INFLUENCE COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EFFECTS OF ENGINE PARAMETERS ON PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS 
Percenta e Change in Engine Measurements Due to 
a 1 B Perturbation in Engine Parameter 
Pump Discharge Fuel 
Pressures Injector Flowmeter Flows Pressure 
Engine Parameter Perturbed Lox Fuel Drop Lox 
Fuel =I YiJ;;) 
High Pressure Lox Duct Area -0.01 0.14 -0.08 0.04 0.21 0.23 0.07 0.,07 
High Pressure Fuel Duct Area -0.03 -0.15 0.06 -0.05 0.09 -0.03 -0.01 0.17 
Lox Bootstrap Line Area 0.24 0.21 0.03 0.20 0.24 0.14 0.16 ' 0.62 
Fuel Bootstrap Line Area 0.07 Lox Injector Area - .13 I 0.06 -0.02 1 -0.01 o*05 1 "0::; 
I ~ 
1 -:::; ! -1:: / -::: 1:::; 
Fuel Injector Area -0.07 -0.54 -4.06 -0.18 0.31 -0.07 -0.07 0.52 
Lox Turbine Efficiency 1.15 0.66 -0.38 1.12 0.33 0.72 0.34 1.01 
Fuel Turbine Efficiency 0.48 0.76 0.50 0.19 1.17 0.23 Oi68 -0.48 
Gas Generator Nozzle Area 0.72 0.63 0.04 0.59 0.64 0.43 0.46 0.53 
Main Chamber Nozzle Area -0.60 -0.44 0.98 0.08 -0.13 -0.23 -0.19 -0:47 
Lox Turbine Bypass Valve -0.09 -0.06 0.04 -0.09 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.08 
Area 
Effect of Main Chamber 0.03 0.13 0.96 0.05 -0.08 0.02 0.01 -0.21 
Combustion Temperature on 
Cooling Jacket Temperature 
(K120) 
Table 5-4. NOMLIZED ONE-SIGMA VARIANCES IN ENGINE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS 
Combustion Chamber 
Pressures Pup Discharge Flowmeter Turbopump Fuel 
Pressures Flows Speeds Turbine Main Gas Inlet 
Chamber Generator Lox Fuel Lox Fuel Lox Fuel Temperature 
4 J-2 Engine 
Qualification Test 
Runs (3 different 
engines, corrected 
to standard 
environment) 
56 RLlOA-3S Engines 
WI I 
F3 
24 RLlOA-3C Engines 
12 RLlOA-3-1 
Engines 
(All RLlO data 
corrected to 
standard environ- 
ment and standard 
mixture ratio) 
10 J-2 Analog 
Simulation Runs 
6 J-2 Analog 
Simulation Runs 
0.0103 0.0386 0.0242 0.0259 0.0153 0.0103 0.0087 0.00354 0.0591 
0.0052 0.0176 0.0167 
0.0058 0.0246 0.0237 
0.0025 0.0174 0.0163 
0.0089 
0.0086 
0.0036 0.0024 0.0033 0.0026 0.0017 0.0008 0.0013 0.0012 
0.0022 0.0018 0.0018 0.0017 0.0015 0.0021 0.0009 0.0009 
0.0111 
0.0018 
SECTION VI 
MALFUNCTION AND DECISION PAIR ANALYSIS 
cot4p1L~TIoN (MADPAC) 
6.1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
The Malfunction and Decision Pair 
Analysis Compilation (MADPAC) is a tab- 
ulation of component malfunctions with 
remedial action decisions and their effect 
on mission and crew loss. The data con- 
tained in MADPAC form the basic input for 
the READ1 design. From these data various 
combinations of malfunction sensors and 
remedial actions can be evaluated in terms 
of their effectiveness in reducing mission 
and crew losses. It is obvious that in a 
real mission-vehicle complex such as 
Saturn V the volume of data which must be 
assembled and operated upon is extremely 
large. The use of hand computations would 
be a cumbersome and time-consuming task. 
For this reason, the MADPAC data are stored 
on a computer tape, and various printouts 
have been programmed to meet the require- 
ments of the READ1 synthesis and evalua- 
tion procedures. In addition to the time 
savings, this approach affords a great 
deal of flexibility. The computer program 
can easily be modified to permit re-eval- 
uation of a candidate READ1 system in the 
event a weighting factor or other variable 
is changed. The basic input and output 
formats used in MADPAC are described in 
subsections 6.2 and 6.3. 
6.2 DEFINITION AND FORMAT OF INPUTS 
The MADPAC input format is typified 
by the computer printout shown in figure 
6-1. The column headings that have been 
included in figure 6-l are defined in 
table 6-l. 
The first line of the input data 
contains the coded definition of the 
particular component malfunction. In the 
example, figure 6-1, the malfunction of 
stalling of the fuel pump of the J-2 
engine in the SIVR stage of the Saturn V 
vehicle is shown. 
The following lines of input data 
define the probability of component 
failure during a particular mission phase, 
the conditional probability of the 
failure causing a loss of the prime 
mission with the assumption that a par- 
ticular remedial action has been taken, 
and the conditional probabilities of the 
various mission alternates that may re- 
sult if the prime mission is lost. 
The input data on figure 6-l repre- 
sents three different possible READ1 
systems, identified by the entry numbers 
in the last column. Each entry number 
includes a set of data that defines the 
system operation over the various mission 
phases. For the example shown, there are 
two significant phases - SIVR first and 
second engine start periods. The system 
identified as Entry Number 1 is the basic 
system with no READ1 remedial actions. 
The data show that occurrence of the mal- 
function will always result in the loss of 
the prime mission @=l) and that approxi- 
mately one-third of these losses will be 
6-1 
Al = LUNAR ORBITAL ALTERNATE 
A2 q CIRCUMLUNAR ALTERNATE 
A3 = EARTH ORBITAL ALTERNATE 
A4 = DIRECT EARTH ABORT 
A5 = CATASTROPHIC LOSS 
r 
SYS SUBS s SUBS COMP FUNC FMODE VENO 
r ST EN REM 
UNREL BETA P(AI) P(A2) P(A3) P(A4) P(A5) ENTRY NO 
‘1 
L-1 34 20---2__n_18950L lJ 
L 1 130 -0 .ooo -.ooo -9000 -.ooo '.ooo -,ooo -'to00 
dOme-31 -0 193LLtm~l.dUO -.000-.080,.6AOQOe.-32 
31 32 -0 .ooo ,000 -9000 -.ooo DO00 -,ooo ,000 1 
323 -0 .QO_Qr_LQO.O -rOOO -,Qf-e~S,QQO-.rdILL 
143 44 -0 1323.000 l.COO ,230 ,450 -.ooo -,ooo ,320 
44 46 -0 r@OO "000 00 0000 .OOO -.OOO -.QQOQ 
1 130 300 ,000 -.ooo -9000 -.ooo -*ooo -rOOO -rooo 2 
3re33338r011~.200 -.O-Q!l+J; ,998 
32 333 .ooo -.ooo -.ooo -rooo 
32~33C.O -  kJ  ~~cg~~o~.P_o_o~boo-.( lo 0  -  l 0  0  0  2 
143 44 333 1323.000 ,200 l 333 ,665 -rooo L.000 eoo2 2 
44 44-333 ,000 -,UOO -.OCO-. 000 --- - -.oljo -.ooo -rOOQ 2 ._--- 
1 130 300 ,000 -.ooo -*ooo -.ooo -to00 -,ooo -rooo 3 
130 -0 0.33 ~3L30.Ll93&000~l.C00~~oOO-yJaJ-~.9.9lLo.0.0 
---LiT2~~ 
,000 -.ooo -*ooo -.ooo -,ooo -.ooo 
-0 0 o-.-o 0.0.0 0.02..0 0 0x3 Q  0 oL?!%o 0 o--?ho 0 
143 44 301 1323.000 1.000 .331 ,660 -*ooo -rooo 
44 46 301 l 0.04 - .OOO -~Q~O.O_r_h-e _ _- 000 'a000 
-0 -0 -0 -rooo -.ooo -*ooo -.ooo -.ooo 
L 
>- 
FIGURE 6-l. TYPICAL MADPAC INPUT FORMAT 
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catastrophic E(A5) = 0.321. If they are and almost complete elimination of crew 
catastrophic, a successful separation of risk. The alternative system, with de- 
the control and service modules will lead tection and shutdown (remedial action 
to the possibility of an earth orbital, number 301) is almost as effective in 
a lunar orbital, or a circumlunar mission, reducing crew risk, but cannot s,ave any 
depending on when the malfunction occurs. prime mission losses. 
Entry Number 2 identifies a system 
that provides a stall anticipation and 
corrective remedial action (identified 
by number 333 in the REM column). In 
this casgonly 20 percent of the malfunc- 
tions result in the loss of the prime 
mission (@=0.2) and a very small fraction 
of these losses are catastrophic since 
the system provides additional warning 
time for escape. 
Figure 6-3 illustrates a slightly 
different output format which shows how 
the prime mission criticality is divided 
among the various possible mission 
alternates. 
Table 6-l. DEFINITION OF MADPAC 
PRINTOUT HEADINGS 
Heading Description 
Entry Number 3 identifies a system 
that contains stall detection and provides 
an engine shutdown remedial action (301). 
Occurrence of the malfunction always leads 
to the loss of the prime mission, but 
most of the time this loss is due to 
deliberate shutdown rather than physical 
damage; therefore about one percent of 
the losses are catastrophic. 
System 
Subsystem 
Sub-subsystem 
Component 
Function 
Failure Mode 
Vehicle Number 
Event which marks start of phase 
Event which marks end of phase 
Remedial Action 
6.3 DEFINITION AND FORMAT OF OUTPUTS 
SYS 
SUBS 
SSUBS 
COMP 
FUNC 
FMODE 
VENO 
ST 
EN 
REM 
UNREL 
The basic MADPAC output format is 
illustrated in figure 6-2, which contains 
the criticalities computed from the input 
data of figure 6-l. The various column 
headings are defined in table 6-l. For 
each input entry number there is an output 
line that sums the criticalities over 
the mission phases for that particular 
system. 
The number of components which 
fail in the phase and mode per 
million 
BETA The probability that existing 
failure will cause loss of prime 
mission 
PhIi) 
PMAL 
Mission alternate transition 
probabilityjthe conditional proba- 
bility that having lost the prime 
mission,alternate Ai results. 
Number of missions per million 
which fly in the phase with the 
malfunction. 
The data in figure 6-2 indicate that 
the stall alleviation system (remedial 
action number 333) results in a substan- 
tial reduction of prime mission criticality 
j j-l 
PMAL j = UNRELk - CRITk 
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---S+S+H~UB~SJB~2&COM~2-FUNC-O-FMODE-l89-V~NO-5Ol GROU~&---&l~-- 
_..- 
ST EN REM UNREL BETA PMAL CRIT GAMA CCRIT ALMF MCRIT T&IT DCRIT DCCRIT DMCRIT DTCRIT 
1 130 -0 000 -,ooo .oo -.oo ,000 -100 ,000 -.oo -.oo a00 ,oo ,oo 100 
--M-1---- 01;93~0-1~000-1938.00-1938.00---r320--620~~~-,966-1872~-11-8073.~71~*00.00. oo------roo- 
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__ 
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143 44 3331323.00 ,200 2873.40 574.68 ,002 1.15 ,667 383.40 399.98 740.32 422.21 639.20 4861.30 
~"L3L+00-dlO0&2298~72--- .OO--tOO~~~-OO~OOO---.OO p-1. oo- *oo--,Oa~-oo-, o&------ 
962+2-3Mu &&3--2~~4~n~ 
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SYS 2132 SUBS 24 SSUBS 20 COMP 2 FUNC 0 FMoDE 189 VENO 501 
ST EN REM UNREL BETA Ml M2 M3 
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130 31 -01938.00 11000 -.00 -.oo 1317.64 
31 32 -0 000 *on0 -.oo -.oo l oo 
32 143 -0 .oo -.ooo .oo .oo .oo 
143 44 -01323.00 1.000 304.29 595.35 -roe 
44 46 -0 l oo a000 100 .DO -000 
I, 
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31 32 301 900 -.ooo roe .oo 000 
32 143 300 .oo -1000 .oo .OO l O O  
143 44 3011323.00 1.000 437.91 873.18 -.oo 
44 46 301 100 -.ooo l oo .O@ l O O  
SUMS 437.91 873.18 1920.56 
M4 M5 MCRIT TCRIT 
l oo .oo -.oo -.oo 
-100 620.16 1872.11 8073.71 
-.oo .oo l oo 000 
l oo .oo -.oo -.oo 
-*I30 423.36 1022.hS 5256.28 
-*oo .oo -00 .oo 
.OO 1043.52 2894.79 13329.99 
moo .oo -.oo -.03 
-.oo .70 363.26 375.01 
l oo .oo - .OO -.oo 
900 000 -000 -.oo 
-*oo 1.15 383.48 394.96 
.oo 900 -.OO -.oo 
l oo 1.92 751.74 770.99 
000 000 -.oo -.oo 
-.no 17,44 1841.97 2016.39 
.oo .oo -.oo -.oo 
000 .oo -.oo -.oo 
-000 11;91 665.38 1004.95 
.oo 000 -.oo -.oo 
l oo 29.35 2727.65 3021.34 
DCRIT 
.oo 
l oo 
000 
l oo 
l oo 
*oo 
000 
-900 
1550.40 
l oo 
-.oo 
740.32 
l oo 
2290.72 
-100 
-.oo 
.oo 
-.oo 
-.oo 
-00 
l oo 
GROUP NO. 112 
DCCRIT DMCRIT 
.oo 100 
.oo so0 
.oo .oo 
100 moo 
.oo a00 
*oo .OO 
a00 moo 
-.oo -.oo 
619.38 1503.85 
100 .oo 
‘.OO -.oo 
422.21 639.20 
100 .oo 
1041.60 2143.04 
-.oo -900 
602.72 30.14 
.oo .oo 
-.oo -.oo 
411.45 136.80 
.oo ".oO 
1014.17 16e.93 
DTCRIT 
roe 
900 
800 
.oo 
a00 
so0 
roe 
-.oo 
7697.70 
100 
-a00 
4861.30 
roe 
12559.00 
-.oo 
6057.32 
moo 
-100 
4251.33 
.oo 
10308.64 
Table 6-1. DEFINITION OF MADPAC Table 6-l. DEFINITION OF MADPAC 
PRINTOUT HEADlNGS (Cont'd) PRINTOUT HEADINGS (Cont'd) 
Heading Description Heading Description 
CRIT 
GAMA 
CCRIT 
ALMF 
Criticality - the number of prime 
missions per million which are 
lost in the phase 
CRITj = (PMAL jj (BETA j) 
The conditional probability that 
the prime mission loss will result 
in the loss of the crew 
N 
GAMA =c P (Ai) Lc (Ai) 
i=l 
Lc (Ai) = Crew loss associated 
with alternate A. 
1 
Crew criticality - the probability 
of crew loss x 106 
CCRIT = (GRIT) (GAMA) 
Alternate mission factor - the 
ratio of mission value loss when 
alternates have value to mission 
value loss when alternates have 
no value 
N 
fiMF = c P (Ai) Lm (Ai) 
i=l 
Lm (Ai) = Mission loss associated 
with alternate A. 1 
MCRIT 
TCRIT 
DCRIT 
DCCRIT 
DMCRIT 
DTCRIT 
Mi 
Mission criticality - the 
normalized mission value lost per 
million based on the concept of 
alternate missions 
WRIT = (GRIT) (ALMF) 
Total criticality - the combined 
criticality of mission and crew 
TCRIT = MCRIT + h (CCRIT) 
(A = 10 for the example shown) 
CRIT (no remedial action) - CRIT 
(with remedial action) 
CCRIT (no remedial action) - CCRIT 
(with remedial action) 
MCRIT (no remedial action) - MCRIT 
(with remedial action) 
TCRIT (no remedial action) - TCRIT 
(with remedial action) 
The number of missions per 
million which will result in 
alternate Ai rather than in the 
prime mission. 
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SECTION VII 
MALFUNCTION SENSING MODEL 
7 .l INTRODUCTION 
The effectiveness of a READ1 system 
or a particular function of READ1 is 
dependent on its ability to sense the 
existence of malfunctions that require 
remedial action. An understanding of the 
available malfunction sensing processes 
is therefore necessary for preliminary 
design and effectiveness estimating 
purposes as well as for detailed equipment 
design phases. 
The situations that are of most 
interest are the malfunctions that fullfill 
the following conditions: 
- The malfunctions lead to extremely 
hazardous end effects involving 
structural failures; 
- The remedialaction itself is costly, 
usually involving sacrifice of prime 
mission, but not as costly as a 
structural failure; 
- A decision on the remedial action 
must be made before the final 
structural failure occurs. 
The fact that the remedial action 
decision must be made before structural 
failure has occurred introduces the possi- 
bility of unnecessary aborts or the need 
to accept the risk of an unnecessary abort 
to prevent a catastrophic loss. READ1 
system value therefore is dependent on 
how accurately the malfunction can be 
assessed so that unnecessary aborts can 
be minimized while still preventing 
catastrophic failures. 
The mechanism of the structural 
failure of an engine usually involves a 
cause and effect chain that begins with 
some discrete failure such as a leak, a 
frozen valve, or a broken wire, and even- 
tually results in overstressing some 
structural members. The sensing of the 
initial, intermediate, and final effects 
of a discrete failure provides many 
possibilities for design of malfunctions 
sensing. 
Since there are usually a great many 
more initial malfunctions than possible 
structural failures, the effects of the 
malfunctions can be drawn in the form of 
a tree that converges to the final cata- 
strophic failures. A simplified example 
of such a failure effects tree is shown 
in figure 7-l. 
Sensing effects near the end of this 
converging network have the advantage that 
relatively few variables need be sensed 
to pick up many malfunctions. Also, the 
effect on the stress parameters that cause 
structural failures can be accurately 
assessed. In fact,the stress variable 
itself can be measured. The sensing of 
these relatively final effects has the 
disadvantage that the lead time provided 
is often inadequate to permit effective 
remedial action before the catastrophic 
failure occurs. Furthermore)the originating 
7-l 
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FIGURE 7-l. FAILURE EFFECTS TREE (ACTUATOR HARDOVER) 
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malfunction may not be localized suffi- 
ciently to allow the choice of the most 
appropriate remedial action. 
Sensing of the initial or inter- 
mediate effects, on the other hand, does 
provide greater lead time and more accurate 
localization but has the disadvantage of 
requiring more transducers. 
The optimum design of a READ1 system 
requires the sensing of both initial and 
intermediate effects. In fact,it is 
usually desirable to utilize more than one 
set of measurements for each malfunction 
group to prevent the possibility of false 
alarms due to a single defective 
transducer. 
This section does not treat the 
problem of optimizing the design of READI 
with fallible equipment which is subject 
to random failure, since this problem 
has been analyzed in detail in previous 
READ1 reports listed in the Foreword. 
The particular problem treated here is 
the design of the malfunction detection 
network, taking into account the stochastic 
nature of the operating parameters and 
malfunction induced stresses. 
7.2 MODEL OF PROCESS 
A random failure occurrence initiates 
a chain of effects that may terminate in 
catastrophic failure. This is illustrated 
in figure 7-2, which also indicates the 
processes involved in malfunction sensing. 
READI may sense any or all of the 
four possible effects shown in figure 7-2. 
In most cases, sensing of the final cata- 
strophic effect is too late. Adequate 
warning time must be provided to allow 
crew escape to a distance sufficient to 
withstand any ensueing explosion if these 
effects are not prevented by timely shut- 
down. 
Use of direct initial sensing of the 
failed component is also feasible only 
when the component is already equipped 
with the sensing device. Otherwise, too 
many transducers are required to implement 
the system. 
The sensing of intermediate effects 
on the stress variables are of particular 
interest and are discussed in the following 
subsections. 
7.3 'SENSING THE INTERMEDIATE VARIABLE 
By far, the most desirable measurements 
to employ for malfunction sensing are'those 
associated with intermediate effects. 
Intermediate measurements are a good 
compromise between the enormous number of 
measurements required to pinpoint every 
malfunction and the high risk associated 
with looking at only the final effects. 
The prime condition for the use of 
intermediate measurements is a knowledge 
of the deterministic chain of events from 
initial to final effects, hence the ability 
to predict the final effect. Such knowledge 
is derived from detailed analytical treat- 
ment of the subsystems, computer simula- 
tion, surveys of subsystem development 
tests,results, and special test - to - 
failure and failure inducing tests on the 
subject hardware. 
Numerous examples of the use of inter- 
mediate measurements are found in the 
design of a typical READ1 system. Figure 
7-l indicates that the thrust vector 
actuator command signal may be a suitable 
7-3 
STRENGTH 
/ 
POSSIBLE 
SENSED 
PARAMETERS 
INTERMEDIATE 
EFFECTS OF 
MALFUNCTION 
INITIAL 
COMPONENT 
INITIAL 
EFFECTS 
SHUTDOWN 
DECISIONS 
EFFECTS ON 
STRUCTURAL 
MEMBER 
FIGURE 7-2. MODEL OF PROCESS 
CATASTROPHIC 
FAILURE 
i 
input to predict an all engines hardover 
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starting. Overboard or tank return flow 
through bleed valves is employed to 
accomplish the chilling operation. If the 
bleed valve fails to close at start, a 
very hazardous condition may result because 
of lox rich combustion in the gas genera- 
tor and main chamber. For this situation 
the following measurements are available, 
for malfunc ion sensing: 
- 
Bleed valve position 
Bleed flow 
Bleed valve pressure drop 
Bleed flow 
Bleed valve pressure drop 
Pump flow, pressure, and 
speed 
Gas generator temperature 
.Fuel injection temperature 
Gas generator burn-through* 
Main chamber burn-through* 
Loss of pump speed 
Loss of thrust 
Before main start signal 
(Discharge start tank valve 
signal in the case of the J-2 
engine) 
After main start signal 
If the bleed valve is signaled to 
close and fails to do so, the flow through 
the chilldown system will continue. If 
there is a delay between the signal to 
close the bleed valve and the signal to 
start the engine, the indication of flow 
during this interval will be an indication 
of valve failure. After the start signal 
is given, the open bleed valve can be 
detected from the resulting abnormality 
in the pump performance in terms of main 
flow, pressure rise, and speed. 
--me--_ 
*Possible hazardous effects. 
The measurement of gas generator 
temperature is associated directly with 
the failure mechanism. This type of 
measurement is discussed in the following 
subsection. 
7.4 SENSING THE STRESS VARIABLE 
structural failure modes of a 
and the assoc iated stress var 
can cause the failures. 
Figure 7-3 illustrates some typical 
rocket engine 
iables tha t 
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FIGURE 7-3. POSSIBLE ENGINE FAILURE MODES 
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The engine will normally be designed 
so that the structural members can with- 
stand normal variations in engine operat- 
ing parameters with a very low probability 
of failure. However, when a malfunction 
is present in the engine,much larger 
excursions of the stress parameters are 
experienced and a higher probability of 
failure can be expected. 
The variations of stress and strength 
of a normal engine are usually represented 
as random variables having a normal dis- 
tribution. Likewise,the stress variable 
under malfunction conditions can be 
assumed to be normally distributed since 
it is the net effect of many possible 
different malfunctions of varying 
amplitudes. 
A typical example is shown in figure 
7-4. The stress on a particular structural 
member under normal conditions has a mean 
deviation, uo, and the strength of the 
member has mean a deviation, u f' The mean 
values of the two parameters are separated 
by a sufficient margin, 
( Xf -z,)=qJT 
so that the chance of random failure is 
very small. For the no-malfunction con- 
dition, shown in figure 7-4, the chance of 
a random failure is only 32 x 10s6. 
Under malfunction conditions the mean 
deviation of stress is increased to 
( Xf - zo)= q-qxy 
to yield a conditional probability of 0.16 
for a catastrophic structural failure, 
given a malfunction. 
A sensor threshold can be interposed 
between the strength and stress distribu- 
tions so that when the stress exceeds the 
threshold,the engine is shutdown and 
catastrophic loss is prevented at the 
expense of an engine shutdown and the 
consequent effect on mission capability. 
However, since the stress and strength 
distributions overlap there is no sensor 
setting for which there will be no 
unnecessary shutdowns (when the engine 
would not have failed) and there will 
always be come possibility of not shutting 
down when engine failure will result. 
Figure 7-4 illustrates the four 
possible end states: 
- Normal: No malfunction has occurred, 
hence the probability of failure or 
shutdown is negligible. 
- Safe Off-Design: A malfunction has 
occurred, but the engine continues 
to run safely in an off-design con- 
dition, and no shutdown occurs. 
- Safe Shutdown: A malfunction has 
occurred, but the condition has been 
sensed and the engine safely shutdown. 
- Explosion: A malfunction has occurred, 
but the sensor was not actuated and 
failure occurred. 
The optimum setting of the sensor is 
the setting that minimizes the total 
expected risk due to these four end states. 
In figure 7-4,the sensor setting balances 
the false and missed alarm rates to optimize 
the system for the assigned loss values 
shown in the figure. The resulting dis- 
tribution of probabi.J=it%s for the four 
end states and expected loss are tabulated 
in figure 7-4 with comparison value figures 
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for no READ1 and an ideal sensor. An ideal 
sensor is one that will shutdown the 
engine only when a failure actually occurs. 
The results for this example show a risk 
reduction of 75 percent which compares 
favorably with the 84 percent possibly 
with a theoretical ideal sensor. The per- 
formance of the practical sensor improves 
with increasing value of the am/af ratio. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
A practical READ1 system will make 
use of a variety of input measurements 
ranging from initial to final effects. In 
general,the measurement of intermediate 
effects unrelated to stress are preferred. 
Practical experience in preliminary 
synthesis of detection equations for the 
subsystems in Saturn V indicate that, for 
over 60 percent of the malfunctions,suit- 
able combinations of intermediate measure- 
ments may be found to indicate and verify 
the malfunction. When the measurement 
of the variable under stress is employed, 
careful consideration must be given to 
the selection of the alarm point. For 
realistic stress and strength distribu- 
tions a substantial risk reduction can be 
achieved, even when measuring the stress 
variable alone. 
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APPENDIX A 
J-2 ENGINE MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
The mathematical model that was 
employed in analog computer simulation of 
the J-2 engine dynamics consists of a set 
of equations that define the pressures and 
flows within the engine as functions of 
propellant tank pressures and valve posi- 
tions. Figure A-l is a simplified engine 
schematic diagram that shows the locations 
of the various valves and the discrete 
points within the engine that are repre- 
sented in the model equations. 
The lox and fuel tank pressures are 
treated as constants. Figure A-2 shows 
how the normal engine valve positions were 
varied for the start and cutoff transients. 
The lox and fuel bleed valves were nor- 
mally considered to be closed, except for 
occasional operation to represent malfunc- 
tions or remedial actions. The propellant 
utilization valve was normally considered 
in the neutral position, half open. It 
also was varied occasionally, for remedial 
action purposes, at a maximum time of 1 
second to swing from nominal to full open 
or full closed. 
Table A-l defines the symbols and 
units employed in the model equations. 
The equations themselves are listed in 
table A-2. In addition, figures A-3 and 
A-4 give the values of nonlinear functions 
that are employed in the equations. Fig- 
ure A-5 shows the value of a nonlinear 
function that represents the gas generator 
ignition and combustion limits. The 
effect of this function is to keep the gas 
generator chamber pressure at zero until a 
l/l O/F ratio is obtained, and to reduce 
the pressure to zero if the O/F ratio 
falls below one half. 
Note that in table A-2 there are two 
equations listed for the hot gas flow to 
the fuel turbine. Equation (34) is rigor- 
ous with respect to maintaining flow con- 
tinuity, while the alternate, equation 
(34*), has the effect of introducing an 
empirical correction for the velocity of 
the hot gas flow through the turbines. It 
appeared that equation (34) was preferable 
for simulation of disturbances from the 
steady-state operating condition, while 
equation (34*) was a better representation 
for large transients such as start of 
cutoff. 
Correlation of the model behavior 
with actual engine test data was good, but 
the engine data were limited to normal 
start transients. Test data that included 
engine malfunction transients were not 
available. 
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Table A-l 
SYMBOLS AND UNITS USED IN ENGINE MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
Symbol Definition units 
A' Area of valve opening relative to 
maximum open area 
c* Characteristic velocity ft/sec 
Turbopump speed 
Rate of change of turbopump speed 
Pressure 
Rate of change of pressure 
rpm 
rpm/sec 
lbs/in2 
lbs/in2/sec 
T Temperature 
ri Rate of change of temperature 
*I3 
OR/set 
. 
w . . 
W 
Flow rate 
Rate of change of flow rate 
lbs/sec 
lbs/sec2 
Subscripts: 
Numbers in figure A-l refer to the subscripts after the variables (such as flow 
and pressure) in table A-2. 
0 
f 
FBV 
FPV 
GGFV 
GGLV 
LBV 
LPV 
LTBV 
MFV 
MLV 
PUV 
STDV 
GO 
MC 
Lox turbopump 
Fuel turbopump 
Fuel Bleed Valve 
Fuel Pre Valve 
Gas Generator Fuel Valve 
Gas Generator Lox Valve 
Lox Bleed Valve 
Lox Pre Valve 
Lox Turbine Bypass Valve 
Main Fuel Valve 
Main Lox Valve 
Propellant Utilization Valve 
Start Tank Discharge Valve 
Gas Generator 
Main Chamber 
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TABLE A-2. ENGINE MATHEMATICAL MOCEL EQUATIONS 
Equations constants 
Oxidizer Flow Equations 
(11 LOX Inlet Duct 1 Wl-2 = r 
2 [ 
IP, - P;!l - +I;,-,,2 
LP” 1 $ = 0.00253 K, q 0.0000129 
I21 Pressure Utilization Valve w32 = 2K,, A’,,, (P, - P, )1’2 
x3 = w1-2 + u3-2 
K 14 = 2.3247 
( q q 0.000187l39 
13) LOX Pump 
. . 
w3-4 = - It, [(P, - P4’ - K,/ (;3-4)2 1 (4) LOX High Pressure lXlct K, = 0.0072 
i,-, q sooA’,,, rP4 - P1 )I’* (5) LOX Bleed Valve P1 = 39 psi 
K 12 = 0.036 
I K200 = 5.82 
; Kll = 9.99 
63 = 0.4432 
1 
w4-g = r ‘P., - Pg) - K,, G4-, P 
12 1 16) LOX Bootstrap Line 
wQ-10 = K13A'GGLV IP, - P,,W 
"4-5 = K~A'~~V ‘P4 - P5W 
“S-30 = KlO ‘P5 - P30w 
171 Gas Generator LOX Valve 
(8) Main LOX Valve 
19) LOX Injector 
/ G = 73.9 
x I 10 = 36.5 
1 Oxidizer Pressure Equations 
I 
C1N,‘tC2K,ooN,w,-,-C3 $,,k, I2 ; K 1oo = 6.32 
cl = 1.6024 x 1c-5 
c, = 1.061 x 1C-4 
K 15 = 211 
K 115 = 2.0 
K 10 = 1040.0 
! 
or 
CeN,2+C5K,,,No~,-3-Cq(K100;2-3 1’ 
I101 LOX Pump Head P3 - Pz = Minimum of c, = 1.009 x x-5 c, = 4.534 x K-5 ., 
C, = 2.795 x 10-5 C, = 1.472 x UP5 
Ill ) LOX Pump Discharge 
(12) Main LOX Valve Inlet 
b3 = K,, I;,-, - ;3-4 1 
b4 = Xl5 lizm4 - vqe5 - b4-1 - ;4-Q1 
1.0 
f[P51 = 
0 < P, < 60 psi 
m 60 psi ( P, 
(131 LOX Injector Inlet 
(14) Gas Generator LOX Valve Inlet 
b5 = K,,, f [P,j t&w5 - ;5-301 
i, q K,, &,-Q - ;Q-lo) 
LOX Bleed Valve Position 
(15) A’,,, = 1.0 or 0; Nominally 0 
TABLE A-2. ENGINE MATHEMATICAL MODEL EQUATIONS (Continued) 
Equations 
Propellant Utilization Valve Position 
(16) o < A' puV 5 1.0; NominallyA'pvv = 0.5 
(171 Maximum A'p,,V = * 0.5/set 
Fuel Flow Equations 
118) Fuel Inlet Duct 
(191 Fuel Pump 
I201 Fuel High Pressure Duct 
I211 Fuel Bleed Valve 
(221 Fuel Bootstrap Line 
(23) Gas Generator Fuel Valve 
K3 
"21-22 P,,) - A' L-2*)* 
FB" 1 
%a-23 = "21-22 
(P23 - P,,) - K,, (~23-28 . I"] 
"23-21 = K52 A',,, !p23- pz~ 
p/2 
- '29' - K80 ('23-29) 1 
w29-10 = K,2 A GGF" "29 - p1011'2 
124) Main Fuel Valve "m-27 = K5e A'HFV (P2, - P27 11/a 
(25) Fuel Injector 37-30 = K,Q p27 T$!:o f[p27/p301 
Fuel Pressure Equations 
(26 1 Fuel Pump Head 
C5Nf2+C K * 8 10~Nf"22-23-C,(K,08W22-23 12 
P23-P22=Minimum of Or 
C8iK108'22-2312 
(271 Fuel Pump Discharge 
(28) Main Fuel Valve Inlet 
129) Fuel Injector Inlet 
'23 = K55 (;22-23 - '23-26 - '23-21 - '23-29) 
b,, = K55 (;23-2e - ;2e-27' 
b,, = K5e T27 (;'2e-27 - ;21-30) 
(301 Gas'Generator Fuel Valve Inlet b,, = Ke3 (;23-2Q - i2Q-lo) 
Constants 
ig = 0.000243 
K53 = 0.00388 
K 52 = 1.45 
KS0 = 1.2 
K 82 = 0.193 
K 5e = 6.46 
K 59 = 1.508 
K 108 = 102.0 
c, = 9.0 x 10-e 
C, = 28.466 Y l0-e 
K55 = 412.0 
K58 = 0.64275 
b3 = 4120.0 
K, q 0.0112 
K5.4 = 0.0157 
Pzl = 30 psi 
t& = 0.0139 
See figure A-3 for f[Pa.,/Pa.l 
c, = 17.04 x 1o-8 C, q 38.18 x 1O-e 
im 
I 
TABLE A-2. ENGINE MATHEMATICAL MODEL EQUATIONS (Continued) 
Fuel Temperature Equations 
-- 
Equations Constants 
.~ 
(311 Thrust Chamber Cooling Jacket 
132) Fuel Injector Inlet 
Fuel Bleed Valve Position 
133) A’F,, q 1.0 or 0; Nominally 0 
T 27 = 2 1 ~'b-30 + KIO,] ho, = 49.5 
k-30 q %zo ‘Go - ‘bg b-,o k -m 
K llg = 0.065 K 120 = 0.1479 
Hot Gas Flow Fquations 
(34) Fuel Turbine wlO-ll = %.-IO + w2g-lo + h A’SDTY e -K22\ b1 = 15.1768 G2 = 0.227 
134’1 Fuel Turbine, Alternate "10-11 = K,,, P,, + K,, A’,,,, e-K22t K 116 = 0.00996 t = time after starting to open the start tank discharge valve, seconds 
(351 LOX Turbine Bypass Valve 
(36 I LOX Turbine 
Hot Gas Pressure Equations 
(37) Gas Generator Chamber 
I381 LOX Turbine Inlet 
Turbopump Speed Equations 
(391 Fuel Turbopump 
I401 LOX Turbopump 
Main Chamber Equations 
%2-15 = 12.56 K,, AILTBV P,, $, q 0.007899 
%-I4 = x30 Pl2 Go q 0.07978 
PlO = K,, [K,oz C',, (;9-1&29-10) f(kg-&,,-,,I - P,,l se = 3250.0 K 102 = 0.015 See fitwe A-4 for C*,, 
i12 = '&g (;m-II - LIZ-15 - ;12-14) kg = 3060.0 See figure A-5 for f(&ol~2,-,ol 
i, = lb5 - kit, $1 &o-11 - K,, @'2,-P22~~22-,3~N, $, = 5879.0 $, = 0.06158 Q, = 9557.225 
i. = (KS1 - K,, NoI &-14 - K,, ~P,-P,~~,&, ~3~ = 4260.0 G2 = 0.1003 & = 433.3 
I41 ) Pressure 
1421 Temperature 
sg q 3250.0 K 103 q 0.000191 See figure A-4 for C*,, 
T 30 = f[~5-~0~~27-,01 See figure A-4 for T,, 
APPENDIX B 
EQUATIONS USED IN THE STAGE PERFORMANCE 
B.l SIVB STAGE 
Since the SIVB flight is exo-atmos- 
pheric and nearly horizontal, the gravity 
component loss was neglected, and the 
single AV relation was used: 
The equation is modified for the three 
time periods under consideration: 
- From launch to start of first burn 
- During first burn 
- During second burn. 
The terms used in the equations are defined 
below: 
Vex0 - 
Vex1 - 
Vex; - 
M fo - 
M fd - 
M(t*) - 
M(tpu) - 
M01 - 
%l - 
M02 - 
Md2 - 
normal Vexhaust = I spa x Go 
effective Vex after malfunction 
modified Vex1 due to PLJ action 
final mass after second burn 
final mass with malfunction 
mass of vehicle at time of 
malfunction 
mass of vehicle when PU unit 
equalizes mass ratio 
mass of vehicle at start of first 
burn, normal 
mass of vehicle at start of first 
burn, malfunction 
mass of vehicle at start of sec- 
ond burn, normal 
mass of vehicle at start of sec- 
ond burn, malfunction 
Mo - 
AM- 
MRP - 
MRPN - 
t* - 
tb - 
t Pu - 
MPk - 
aMPR - 
M orb - 
a- 
a' - 
. 
aMPR - 
- For 
Vex0 
DEGRADATION MODELS 
mass of vehicle at start of sec- 
ond burn, equivalent 
orbital boiloff 
normal usable propellant reserve 
after first burn 
normalized usable propellant reserve 
time-of-occurrence of malfunction 
burn time 
time of PU correction 
normal propellant rate 
change in effective propellant 
rate 
M02 + AM 
vexl/vexo 
vex;/vexo 
MpR modified by PU action 
failure occurring in second burn: 
M 
In o r 1 M(t*) M(t*) + Vex1 In ~ [ 1 Mfo' 
M' 
= Vex0 In+ c 1 f 
(1) 
. 
Mfo' = AMpR (tb-t*) + Mfo (3) 
. 
tb = (MRp-t* MpR)/(MpR + mpR) (4) 
B-l 
M 
pm 
= 'MO' + AM - Mfo)/MRP (5) 
- For failure occurring in first burn: 
(6) 
Vexl' In (M02'/Mfo') = Vex0 In & [ 1 (16) 
I 
MO' = Mfo (M~~'/M~~')~ (17) 
Mfo' as in equation (9) and M pm 
as in equation (5) 
l PU unit corrects mass unbalance 
in second burn 
M' orb = M(t*) M(t*)/Morb 1'a c 1 (7) 
M' 02 = Morb - AM (8) 
Mfo ' = Ai, t Mfo (9) 
. . 
tb = (Mo2’ - MfoV’(MpR t mp,j (10) 
Vex1 In [$$I = Vex0 ln[E] (11) 
MO’ = Mfo (Mo2’/Mfo) (12) 
Proceed as in equation (5) 
- For failure occurring between 
launch and first burn (leaks only): 
0 PU unit cannot correct mass 
unbalance 
Vex1 In [a] = Vexo ln [Mol/Moib] (,, 
M orb ' = M 01' (14) 
M02' = Morb' - AM (15) 
Mo2' as in equation (15) 
Vex1 In C M02'4pu] 
+ Vex1 In M(tpu)/Mfo 1 (18) 
= Vexo l"[Mo'/Mfo] 
tpu =[po1 - MOlj/AiPR] (19) 
- AT (first burn) 
MO' = Mfo[[kJ'[a]a] (20) 
l PU unit corrects mass unbalance 
in first burn 
.Vexl' In - [ 1 MOl' Mtpu 
t Vex1 In M(tpu)/Morb' 1 (21) 
1 
t pu = 1 M01 
- MO1 '
J 
/DfpR' (22) 
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M ' orb = M(tpu) 
(23) 
' )a/a’ . (Mol/Morb) 1’a 1 
Follow equations (8) to (12) and (5). 
I 
NOTE: MfO = Mfo as the PU has 
balanced the mass flow. 
B.2 SII STAGE 
The following list defines the terms 
used in the SIC, SIVB, and SII performance 
equations: 
ioxo - Initial oxidizer flow rate 
ioxw - Oxidizer flow rate at time t 
Moxo - Initial weight of oxidizer 
M  prx - Residual weight of oxidizer at burnout 
. 
Mfo - Initial fuel flow rate 
Ii,(t) - Fuel flow rate at time t 
Mfo 
Mprf 
M  so 
M,(t) 
M(t) 
THRo 
THR(t) 
HO 
H(t) 
I;0 
St) 
V,(t) 
Initial weight of fuel 
Residual weight of fuel at 
burn out 
Initial weight of structure 
and payload 
Weight of structure and payload 
at time t 
Weight of vehicle at time t 
Initial thrust of stage 
Thrust of stage at time t 
Initial altitude of stage 
Altitude of stage at time t 
Initial altitude rate of stage 
Altitude rate of stage at 
time t 
Inertial velocity of vehicle 
at time t 
%  - 
Qs - t 
a - 
R(t) - 
t. leco - 
t* - 
Relative velocity of vehicle 
at time t 
Space-fixed flight path angle 
Angle of attack 
Range at time t (earth centered 
coordinates) 
Time of in-board engine cutoff 
Time-of-occurrence of 
malfunction. 
The purpose of these equations is to 
compute MpRN for various values of 
oxidizer flow (a), fuel flow (p) and 
thrust (y). Each set is run for t* = 0, 
40, 80 ,....., 320 (time of occurrence of 
malfunction). 
The equations for SII are used for 
each iteration of t, until one of the 
tests fails. The equations for SIV are 
then used until the SIVB tests fail. 
MpRN is then computed. 
B.2.1 GENERAL CONSTANTS 
Go = 9.8066 
M(T3) = 16,030 
~~ = 23.8 
R, = 6,378,OOO 
V circ = 7800 
H circ = 1.85,ooo 
QO 
= 2550 
Kl = 0.151 
K2 = 0.05 
K3 = 0.133 
K4 = 0.05 
K. = 0.008096 
At = 4.0 
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B.2.2 SII PERFORMANCE EQUATIONS 
B.2.2.1 Constants 
;oxo = 1800.0 . 
Mfo = 380.0 I 
Assumed 
Values 
Ho = 65,300 
ii0 = 950 
M so = 450,000 
M 0x0 = 780,000 
M 
prx 
= 6600.0 
M fo = 153,000 
M prf = 9900.0 
THRo = 925,000.0 
T2 = 3.8. 
B.2.2.2 Initial Conditions 
t = 4.0 sec. 
Max(t) = Moxo 
Mf(t) = Mfo 
H(t) = Ho 
i(t) = Ho 
vp = v 
J/O 
B.2.2.3 Propellant Utilization Model 
DIFF = 
K4 &$ - Mf(t 
10.6 
I 
DIFF if -0.4 5 
1 if t>8 
I 
(1) 
if t<8 
DIFF 5 1.6 
I 
PU = -0.4 if DIFF < -0.4 (2) 
0.6 if DIFF > 1.6 
iox = ho,, (1 t Kl(PU)) (3) 
i&t) = Mfo ( 1 + K2(PU)) (4) 
THR(t) = THRo (1 t K3(PU)) (5) 
B.2.2.4 Malfunction Effect Control 
ift~t*add~~~~r~~'.~~~~~~! 
B.2.2.5 Mass Equations 
Max(t) = Max(t) - iox At (6) 
My(t) = Mf(t) - if(t) At (7) 
Test for end of burn. If 
Max(t) - Mprx 5 0 
or 
Mf( t) - Mprf 50 
proceed to SIVB equations. 
ift<T 3 
(8) 
- Mt3 ift?T 3 
M(t) = M,(t) t Max(t) t My(t) (9) 
B.2.2.6 Control and Guidance Equations 
Qs = sin (11) 
1 
a = (Hcirc - H(t)) K. - I&) (12) 
if -90" 
if (13) 
if 
B-4 
B.2.2.7 Equations of Motion 
R(t) = H(t) t R, (14) 
ACC = 
G;THR(t) 
M(t) (15) 
0 if t < T2 
I 
(16) 
ACC.sin X.At if t 2 T2 
I2 = Go (&I2 At (17) 
(18) 
if t < T2 
(19) 
q ACC.cos X-At if t 1 T2 
0 
Ai= I1 - 12+ I3 (20) 
H(t) = H(t) t (i(t) t l/2 A$ At (21) 
k(t) = I;(t) t AfI (22) 
V+(t) = VJ,(t) t I4 (23) 
Let t = t + 4.0 and repeat from B.2.2.3 
equation (1). 
~.2.3 sIv PERFORMANCB EQUATIONS 
~.2.3.1 Constants 
Max(t) = iox = 390 
if(t) = if0 = 80 
M,(t) = MS0 = 130,000 
M 0x0 = 180,000 
M prx = 1,800 
M f. = 40,000 
Mprf = 3,000 
TBR(t) = 196,000 
T2 = 0.0 
B.2.3.2 Initial Conditions 
MO,(t) = MO,, 
Mf(t) = My0 
B.2.3.3 Mass Equations 
M,,(t) = MO,(t) - iox At (1) 
Mf(t) = Mf(t) - k,(t) At (2) 
If Vcirc - V+(t) s 0 compute 
MpRN by method 1, B.2.2.5 
equations (6) and (7) and end. 
If Max(t) - Mprx (, 0 
or Mf(t) - Mprf 5 0 compute 
M PRN by method 2, B.2.2.5 I 
SIVB first 
burn ter- 
mination 
test 
equations (8) and (9) and end. 
M(t) = MS(t) + Max(t) + Mf(t) (3) 
B.2.3.4 Guidance Equations 
V,(t) = V+(t) + H(t) J- (4) 
8, = sin-'.&{ (5) 
S 
1 
a = (Hcirc - H(t)) K, - I&) (6) 
x= 
1 
8, t a' if -90" 5 8, t a' 2 90" 
90” if Qs t a' > 90” (7) 
-90” if 8, t a' <-90° 1 
B.2.3.5 Equations of Motion 
R(t) = H(t) t R. (8) 
B-5 
G 'THR(t) 
ACC = ' M(t) 
if t < T2 
ACCesin X-At if t 1 T2 
I2 = G (h2 o R(t) * At 
if t < T2 
ACC*cos X*At if t 2 T2 
I 
AiI = I1 - I2 t I3 
H(t) = H(t) + (i(t) + l/2 A& At (15) 
(9) 
i(t) = It(t) t Ai (16) 
(10) 
V+(t) = V*(t) + I4 
Let t = t t At and repeat from B.2.3.3 
(11) equation (1). 
B.2.4 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
(12‘) Method 1: MpRN = M(t) - 129,000.0 
Method 2: v = Vcirc - V,(t) 
(13) M PRN = M(t)e 
-AV/4300.0 - 129,000.0 
MpRN is then normalized by dividing by 
135,219.07 (the unnormalized MpRN from 
(14) a= p= Y= t*= 0) 
(17) 
B.3 SIC STAGE 
Performance computation (equation 
set) 
(1) Set up at t=o: 
H(t) = o 
II(t) = 0 
q(t) = 0 
g(t) = Q 
Max(t) = Moxo 
Mf(t) = Mfo 
TM = To 
t - 146 seconds. ieco - 
(2) Mass flow equations 
box (t) = r;r 0x0 - (1 + q(0-t*) 
+R t ox ieco (tL tieco) 
slf (t) = if0 * (1 +, p(w_t*) 
+ A, ctiecol Wtieno) 
M ox (t3 = M ox (t) - fiox ('cl-At 
Mf (t) = Mf (t) - flf (t)*At 
M (t) = MS + Max (t) + Mf (t) 
(3) Thrust 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
THR(t) = THR(o) . 1.15-0.15 e-p'H(t)) ( 
(l + qlt>_t* + THR (tieco) 1 t>_tieco ) 
Test: 
If Max (t) - Mprx Lo, or if Mf (t) - 
M prf 20, exit to SII stage or else 
continue. 
(4) Flight parameters 
p (t) = po e--(t) 
R (t) = R(o) + B(t) 
V’R (t) fR(t@(t) - nojjT i2(t) 
L -1 
Q(t) = 1/2p (tbV2R(t) 
tX = the lesser of ( 
Max (t) - Mp 
or (Mf(t) - MpRF )/cl,(t) 
xct 
+ 
) = X(t) - 
= 900, t < t2 
'iecd = t + tx-4 
cs = 347 (T,/A~)~/~ 
MA = VR/Cs 
Bl < MA 2 B2j CBA (t) = C4 + C5 MA 
B2 < MA; CBA (t) = C6 + C7 e c8 MA 
Test: MA 5 100. If yes, continue, if no, 
MA = 100, continue. 
(5') Equations of motion 
'#Y(t) = q(t) +'$(t) - At (1) 
o(t) = X(t) +V(t) (2) 
ACC = 
[ 
Go . TBR(t) - C,,(tbQ(t) 1 +t, (3) 
I 1 = ACC - Sin 0 (t) . At (4) 
I 2 = Go R(o) 2 At 
I3 = &;dt);i At 
(5) 
(6) 
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I4 = R(t) -*ACC.Cos a(t).At 
Ro 
Ai = 11-12+13 
H(t) = H(t) + (k(t) + l/2 Afi).At 
i(t) = H(t) + Ak 
\G(t) =Ro I4 + b(t) 
R(tj2 
VW = R(t)+(t) 
vs =JqzG) 
TM = A0 + Al H + A2 H2; H < 32,000 
TM=A3+A4H+A5H2;H> 32,000 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
Test: TM 2 222. If yes, continue,if no, 
TM = 222, continue,proceed to 2. 
(6) Constants 
RO - 6,378,260 
GO - 9.8066 
@O - 0.1423 
p - l/7170 
X2 - 20.0 
t2 - 8 set 
TO - 288.8 
A0 - 288.8 
I - 0.00394 
A2 - 1355 x 10-10 
Bl - 0.6 
I32 - 1.1 
cl - 22;o 
c2 -(-) 2.88 
c3 - 0.168 
c4 -(-I 27.2 
C 5 -'9?.0 
c6 - 87.9 
c7 - 87.9 
08 -(-) 0.415 
THt. -(-I 0.2 leco 
Box t. leco - C-1 0.2 
of tieco - (-) 0.2 
MS - 1,740,ooo 
M 0x0 - 3,000,000 
M 
mx - 69,000 
Box0 - 20,000 (Assumed) 
Mfo - 1,370,000 
M 
wf - 69,000 
Mfo - 8,700 (Assumed) 
RO - 0.64068 x lo+ 
THRo - 7,500,000 
0: - change in oxidizer flow 
B - change in fuel flow 
Y - change in thrust level. 
A3 - 22.0 
A4 - 0.0155 
A 5 - 0.315 x 10-6 
B-8 
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